[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/4] xen-netfront: drop skb when skb->len > 65535
On Mon, 2013-03-18 at 10:35 +0000, Wei Liu wrote: > The `size' field of Xen network wire format is uint16_t, anything bigger than > 65535 will cause overflow. > > Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> > --- > drivers/net/xen-netfront.c | 12 ++++++++++++ > 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c > index 5527663..8c3d065 100644 > --- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c > +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c > @@ -547,6 +547,18 @@ static int xennet_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct > net_device *dev) > unsigned int len = skb_headlen(skb); > unsigned long flags; > > + /* > + * wire format of xen_netif_tx_request only supports skb->len > + * < 64K, because size field in xen_netif_tx_request is > + * uint16_t. Is there some field we can set e.g. in struct ethernet_device which would stop this from happening? > + */ > + if (unlikely(skb->len > (uint16_t)(~0))) { > + net_alert_ratelimited( > + "xennet: skb->len = %d, too big for wire format\n", > + skb->len); > + goto drop; > + } > + > slots = DIV_ROUND_UP(offset + len, PAGE_SIZE) + > xennet_count_skb_frag_slots(skb); > if (unlikely(slots > MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1)) { _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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