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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH net-next 2/2] xen-netback: avoid allocating variable size array on stack



On Tue, 2013-04-30 at 17:50 +0100, Wei Liu wrote:
> Tune xen_netbk_count_requests to not touch working array beyond limit, so that
> we can make working array size constant.

Is this really correct when max_skb_slots > XEN_NETIF_NR_SLOTS_MIN?
Seems like we would either overrun the array or drop frames which
max_skb_slots suggests we should accept?

If anything the array would need to be size by XEN_NETIF_NR_SLOTS_MAX
which a) doesn't exist and b) would be worse than using max_skb_slots. I
wouldn't be particularly averse to enforcing some sensible maximum on
max_skb_slots.

Other options:

Handle batches of work in <max_skb_slots sized bundles, but that gets
complex when you consider the case of an skb which crosses multiple such
bundles.

xen_netbk_get_requests() copes the tx req again into the pending_tx_info
-- any way we can arrange for this to just happen right in the first
place?

Or perhaps it is time for each vif to allocate a page of its own to
shadow the shared ring, and remove that field from pending_tx_info?
(which isn't really a net increase in memory usage, but might simplify
some things?)

One comment on the existing implementation below...

> Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>  drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c |   26 +++++++++++++++++++++-----
>  1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c 
> b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
> index c44772d..c6dc084 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
> @@ -934,11 +934,15 @@ static int netbk_count_requests(struct xenvif *vif,
>       RING_IDX cons = vif->tx.req_cons;
>       int slots = 0;
>       int drop_err = 0;
> +     int keep_looping;
>  
>       if (!(first->flags & XEN_NETTXF_more_data))
>               return 0;
>  
>       do {
> +             struct xen_netif_tx_request dropped_tx = { 0 };
> +             int cross_page = 0;
> +
>               if (slots >= work_to_do) {
>                       netdev_err(vif->dev,
>                                  "Asked for %d slots but exceeds this 
> limit\n",
> @@ -972,8 +976,12 @@ static int netbk_count_requests(struct xenvif *vif,
>                       drop_err = -E2BIG;
>               }
>  
> -             memcpy(txp, RING_GET_REQUEST(&vif->tx, cons + slots),
> -                    sizeof(*txp));
> +             if (!drop_err)
> +                     memcpy(txp, RING_GET_REQUEST(&vif->tx, cons + slots),
> +                            sizeof(*txp));
> +             else
> +                     memcpy(&dropped_tx, RING_GET_REQUEST(&vif->tx, cons + 
> slots),
> +                            sizeof(dropped_tx));

Can we avoid needing to replicate if (!drop_err) txp else &dropped_tx
with a macro or some other trickery? e.g txp = &dropped_tx and then the
check is only on the txp++?

>  
>               /* If the guest submitted a frame >= 64 KiB then
>                * first->size overflowed and following slots will
> @@ -995,13 +1003,21 @@ static int netbk_count_requests(struct xenvif *vif,
>               first->size -= txp->size;
>               slots++;
>  
> -             if (unlikely((txp->offset + txp->size) > PAGE_SIZE)) {
> +             if (!drop_err)
> +                     cross_page = (txp->offset + txp->size) > PAGE_SIZE;
> +             else
> +                     cross_page = (dropped_tx.offset + dropped_tx.size) > 
> PAGE_SIZE;
> +
> +             if (unlikely(cross_page)) {
>                       netdev_err(vif->dev, "Cross page boundary, txp->offset: 
> %x, size: %u\n",
>                                txp->offset, txp->size);
>                       netbk_fatal_tx_err(vif);
>                       return -EINVAL;
>               }
> -     } while ((txp++)->flags & XEN_NETTXF_more_data);
> +
> +             keep_looping = (!drop_err && (txp++)->flags & 
> XEN_NETTXF_more_data) ||
> +                     (dropped_tx.flags & XEN_NETTXF_more_data);
> +     } while (keep_looping);
>  
>       if (drop_err) {
>               netbk_tx_err(vif, first, cons + slots);
> @@ -1408,7 +1424,7 @@ static unsigned xen_netbk_tx_build_gops(struct 
> xen_netbk *netbk)
>               !list_empty(&netbk->net_schedule_list)) {
>               struct xenvif *vif;
>               struct xen_netif_tx_request txreq;
> -             struct xen_netif_tx_request txfrags[max_skb_slots];
> +             struct xen_netif_tx_request txfrags[XEN_NETIF_NR_SLOTS_MIN];
>               struct page *page;
>               struct xen_netif_extra_info extras[XEN_NETIF_EXTRA_TYPE_MAX-1];
>               u16 pending_idx;



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