[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/2] Xen/vMCE: bugfix to remove problematic is_vmce_ready check

>>> On 03.05.13 at 10:41, "Liu, Jinsong" <jinsong.liu@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 27.04.13 at 10:38, "Liu, Jinsong" <jinsong.liu@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> From 9098666db640183f894b9aec09599dd32dddb7fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
>>> 2001 From: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@xxxxxxxxx>
>>> Date: Sat, 27 Apr 2013 22:37:35 +0800
>>> Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Xen/vMCE: bugfix to remove problematic
>>> is_vmce_ready check 
>>> is_vmce_ready() is problematic:
>>> * For dom0, it checks if virq bind to dom0 mcelog driver. If not, it
>>> results dom0 crash. However, it's problematic and overkilled since
>>> mcelog as a dom0 feature could be enabled/disabled per dom0 option:
>>> (XEN) MCE: This error page is ownded by DOM 0
>>> (XEN) DOM0 not ready for vMCE
>>> (XEN) domain_crash called from mcaction.c:133
>>> (XEN) Domain 0 reported crashed by domain 32767 on cpu#31:
>>> (XEN) Domain 0 crashed: rebooting machine in 5 seconds.
>>> (XEN) Resetting with ACPI MEMORY or I/O RESET_REG.
>>> * For dom0, if really need check, it should check whether vMCE
>>> injection for dom0 ready (say, exception trap bounce check, which
>>> has been done at inject_vmce()), not check dom0 mcelog ready (which
>>> has been done at mce_softirq() before send global virq to dom0).
>> Following the argumentation above, I wonder which of the other
>> "goto vmce_failed" are really appropriate, i.e. whether the patch
>> shouldn't be extended (at least for the Dom0 case).
> You mean other 'goto vmce_failed' are also not appropriate (I'm not quite 
> clear your point)?


> Would you please point out which point you think not appropriate?

I question whether it is correct/necessary to crash the domain in
any of those failure cases. Perhaps when we fail to unmap the
page it is, but failure of fill_vmsr_data() and inject_vmce() don't
appear to be valid reasons once the is_vmce_ready() path is being


Xen-devel mailing list



Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.