Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH RESEND 2/4] xen/arm: remove rcu_lock_target_domain_by_id users

[Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On Fri, 2013-05-03 at 15:09 +0100, Daniel De Graaf wrote:
> This function has been replaced with rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id and an
> XSM check.  Two callers already had an XSM check; add a check to the
> third.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> (for 4.3 release)

For the ARM stuff:
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx>

Since the bulk of the series is elsewhere I expect someone else will be
applying?

> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx>
> ---
>  xen/arch/arm/mm.c       | 23 +++++++++++++++--------
>  xen/include/xsm/dummy.h |  8 ++++++++
>  xen/include/xsm/xsm.h   | 11 +++++++++++
>  xen/xsm/dummy.c         |  3 +++
>  xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c   | 10 ++++++++++
>  5 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/mm.c b/xen/arch/arm/mm.c
> index 03492df..bd6d5f3 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/arm/mm.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/mm.c
> @@ -753,9 +753,16 @@ static int xenmem_add_to_physmap_one(
>      {
>          paddr_t maddr;
>          struct domain *od;
> -        rc = rcu_lock_target_domain_by_id(foreign_domid, &od);
> -        if ( rc < 0 )
> +        od = rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id(foreign_domid);
> +        if ( od == NULL )
> +            return -ESRCH;
> +
> +        rc = xsm_map_gmfn_foreign(XSM_TARGET, d, od);
> +        if ( rc )
> +        {
> +            rcu_unlock_domain(od);
>              return rc;
> +        }
>  
>          maddr = p2m_lookup(od, idx << PAGE_SHIFT);
>          if ( maddr == INVALID_PADDR )
> @@ -847,9 +854,9 @@ long arch_memory_op(int op, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) 
> arg)
>          if ( xatp.space == XENMAPSPACE_gmfn_foreign )
>              return -EINVAL;
>  
> -        rc = rcu_lock_target_domain_by_id(xatp.domid, &d);
> -        if ( rc != 0 )
> -            return rc;
> +        d = rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id(xatp.domid);
> +        if ( d == NULL )
> +            return -ESRCH;
>  
>          rc = xsm_add_to_physmap(XSM_TARGET, current->domain, d);
>          if ( rc )
> @@ -878,9 +885,9 @@ long arch_memory_op(int op, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) 
> arg)
>          if ( xatpr.space == XENMAPSPACE_gmfn_range )
>              return -EINVAL;
>  
> -        rc = rcu_lock_target_domain_by_id(xatpr.domid, &d);
> -        if ( rc != 0 )
> -            return rc;
> +        d = rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id(xatpr.domid);
> +        if ( d == NULL )
> +            return -ESRCH;
>  
>          rc = xsm_add_to_physmap(XSM_TARGET, current->domain, d);
>          if ( rc )
> diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
> index 9bfe596..3912bd9 100644
> --- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
> +++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
> @@ -616,4 +616,12 @@ static XSM_INLINE int xsm_ioport_mapping(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG 
> struct domain *d, uint3
>      return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
>  }
>  
> +#endif /* CONFIG_X86 */
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM
> +static XSM_INLINE int xsm_map_gmfn_foreign(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, 
> struct domain *t)
> +{
> +    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_TARGET);
> +    return xsm_default_action(action, d, t);
> +}
>  #endif
> diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
> index 69fe64a..58a4fbb 100644
> --- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
> +++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
> @@ -162,6 +162,9 @@ struct xsm_operations {
>      int (*ioport_permission) (struct domain *d, uint32_t s, uint32_t e, 
> uint8_t allow);
>      int (*ioport_mapping) (struct domain *d, uint32_t s, uint32_t e, uint8_t 
> allow);
>  #endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM
> +    int (*map_gmfn_foreign) (struct domain *d, struct domain *t);
> +#endif
>  };
>  
>  #ifdef XSM_ENABLE
> @@ -622,6 +625,14 @@ static inline int xsm_ioport_mapping (xsm_default_t def, 
> struct domain *d, uint3
>      return xsm_ops->ioport_mapping(d, s, e, allow);
>  }
>  #endif /* CONFIG_X86 */
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM
> +static inline int xsm_map_gmfn_foreign (struct domain *d, struct domain *t)
> +{
> +    return xsm_ops->map_gmfn_foreign(d, t);
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM */
> +
>  #endif /* XSM_NO_WRAPPERS */
>  
>  extern int xsm_init(unsigned long *module_map, const multiboot_info_t *mbi,
> diff --git a/xen/xsm/dummy.c b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
> index 3d84e73..937761f 100644
> --- a/xen/xsm/dummy.c
> +++ b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
> @@ -132,4 +132,7 @@ void xsm_fixup_ops (struct xsm_operations *ops)
>      set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ioport_permission);
>      set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ioport_mapping);
>  #endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM
> +    set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, map_gmfn_foreign);
> +#endif
>  }
> diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
> index 3291aa2..bb10de3 100644
> --- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
> +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
> @@ -1454,6 +1454,13 @@ static int flask_unbind_pt_irq (struct domain *d, 
> struct xen_domctl_bind_pt_irq
>  {
>      return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, RESOURCE__REMOVE);
>  }
> +#endif /* CONFIG_X86 */
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM
> +static int flask_map_gmfn_foreign(struct domain *d, struct domain *t)
> +{
> +    return domain_has_perm(d, t, SECCLASS_MMU, MMU__MAP_READ | 
> MMU__MAP_WRITE);
> +}
>  #endif
>  
>  long do_flask_op(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xsm_op_t) u_flask_op);
> @@ -1562,6 +1569,9 @@ static struct xsm_operations flask_ops = {
>      .ioport_permission = flask_ioport_permission,
>      .ioport_mapping = flask_ioport_mapping,
>  #endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM
> +    .map_gmfn_foreign = flask_map_gmfn_foreign,
> +#endif
>  };
>  
>  static __init int flask_init(void)



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