Re: [Xen-devel] [Hackathon minutes] PV network improvements

[George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On 05/21/2013 09:22 AM, Ian Campbell wrote:
> On Mon, 2013-05-20 at 19:33 +0100, Wei Liu wrote:
> > On Mon, May 20, 2013 at 03:49:32PM +0100, George Dunlap wrote:
> > [...]
> > > > J) Map the whole physical memory of the machine in dom0
> > > > If mapping/unmapping or copying slows us down, could we just keep the
> > > > whole physical memory of the machine mapped in dom0 (with corresponding
> > > > IOMMU entries)?
> > > > At that point the frontend could just pass mfn numbers to the backend,
> > > > and the backend would already have them mapped.
> > > > >From a security perspective it doesn't change anything when running
> > > > the backend in dom0, because dom0 is already capable of mapping random
> > > > pages of any guests. QEMU instances do that all the time.
> > > > But it would take away one of the benefits of deploying driver domains:
> > > > we wouldn't be able to run the backends at a lower privilege level.
> > > > However it might still be worth considering as an option? The backend is
> > > > still trusted and protected from the frontend, but the frontend wouldn't
> > > > be protected from the backend.
> > > What's missing from this was my side of the discussion:
> > >
> > > I was saying that if TLB flushes from grant-unmap is indeed the
> > > problem, then maybe we could have the *front-end* in charge of
> > > requesting a TLB flush for its pages.  The strict TLB flushing is to
> > > protect a frontend from rogue back-ends from reading sensitive data;
> > > if the front-end were willing to just not use the pages for a short
> > > amount of time, and issue a flush say every second or so, that would
> > > reduce the TLB flushes greatly while maintaining the safety advantages
> > > of driver domains.
> > I'm not sure I get what you mean here. Are you saying DomU flushes
> > Dom0's TLB entries?
> The gnt_unmap made by dom0 needs to flush the TLB of any physical
> processor which may have seen the mapping, which means approximately all
> dom0 vcpus.
That's what I was getting at.  It's Xen that does any actual TLB 
flushes, and for now the "promise" to the front-end is that the page is 
safe from the backend* after the transaction is done.  But it would be 
nicer if we could batch these flushes to happen once every few hundred 
milliseconds, or even one a second.  If we allowed the front-end to 
choose a new the interface, that said "the page is safe from the backend 
once you have made this hypercall", then guests could choose the 
"window" size based on their own parameters.
* Remember that the point of grant maps isn't to allow *dom0* access to 
the guests; dom0 already has all the access it needs.  It's to allow 
driver domains access to the guests.
 -George

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