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Re: [Xen-devel] [Xenhackthon] Virtualized APIC registers - virtual interrupt delivery.



Stefano Stabellini wrote on 2013-05-29:
> On Tue, 28 May 2013, Zhang, Yang Z wrote:
>> Stefano Stabellini wrote on 2013-05-27:
>>> On Mon, 27 May 2013, Zhang, Yang Z wrote:
>>>> Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote on 2013-05-24:
>>>>> On Thu, May 23, 2013 at 08:25:06AM +0000, Zhang, Yang Z wrote:
>>>>>> Jan Beulich wrote on 2013-05-23:
>>>>>>>>>> On 22.05.13 at 18:21, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
>>> <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>> Which means that if this is set to be higher than the hypervisor
>>>>>>>> timer or IPI callback the guest can run unbounded. Also it would
>>>>>>>> seem that this value has to be often reset when migrating a guest
>>>>>>>> between the pCPUs. And it would appear that this value is static.
>>>>>>>> Meaning the guest only sets these vectors once and the hypervisor
>>>>>>>> is responsible for managing the priority of that guest and other
>>>>>>>> guests (say dom0) on the CPU.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> For example, we have a guest with a 10gB NIC and the guest has
>>>>>>>> decided to use vector 0x80 for it (assume a UP guest). Dom0 has
>>>>>>>> an SAS controller and is using event number 30, 31, 32, and 33
>>>>>>>> (there are only 4 PCPUS). The hypervisor maps them to be 0x58,
>>>>>>>> 0x68, 0x78 and 0x88 and spreads those vectors on each pCPU. The
>>>>>>>> guest is running on pCPU1 and there are two vectors - 0x80 and
>>>>>>>> 0x58. The one assigned to the guest wins and dom0 SAS controller
>>>>>>>> is preempted.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> The solution for that seems to have some interaction with the
>>>>>>>> guest when it allocates the vectors so that they are always below
>>>>>>>> the dom0 priority vectors. Or hypervisor has to dynamically shuffle its
>>>>>>>> own vectors to be higher priority.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Or is there an guest vector <-> hypervisor vector lookup table that
>>>>>>>> the CPU can use? So the hypervisor can say: the vector 0x80 in the
>>>>>>>> guest actually maps to vector 0x48 in the hypervisor?
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> It is my understanding that the vector spaces are separate, and
>>>>>>> hence guest interrupts can't block host ones (like the timer). Iirc
>>>>>> Right. virtual interrupt delivery only for delivering guest virtual
>>> interrupt(from
>>>>> emulation device and assigned device.) which is located in guest's
>>>>> vector space. It has nothing to do with other guest.
>>> 
>>> I think you mean "It has nothing to do with _the hypervisor_"?
>> Yes. Both hypervisor and guest have separated vector space.
>> 
>>> 
>>>>> OK, in which case Linux ~v2.6.32 (when the event callback mechanism was
>>>>> introduced for HVM guests) will _not_ take advantage of this, right?
>>>> Yes, event mechanism cannot benefit from it.
>>> 
>>> I think that Konrad was referring to the vector callback mechanism:
>> You are right. What I want to say is vector callback mechanism.
>> 
>>> 
>>> linux side  drivers/xen/events.c:xen_callback_vector
>>> xen side    xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c:hvm_set_callback_via
>>> 
>>> Also see:
>>> 
>>> commit e5fd1f6505c43440bc2450253c79c80174b693bc
>>> Author: Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>> Date:   Tue May 25 11:28:58 2010 +0100
>>> 
>>>     x86 hvm: implement vector callback for evtchn delivery
>>>     
>>>     Signed-off-by: Sheng Yang <sheng@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>>     Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>>     Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>> From the guest point of view it looks like a normal vector callback
>>> (similar to an IPI).
>>> 
>>> 
>>>>> Is there a way to solve this so that they _will_ take advantage of this.
>>>> Perhaps not. virtual interrupt delivery relies on EOI logic to inject the
> pending
>>> interrupt. But event channel doesn't have such mechanism.
>>> 
>>> It's true that we don't do any EOIs with the vector callback mechanism,
>>> the same way the operating system doesn't do any EOIs when it receives
>>> an IPI.
>> IPI also need EOI.
> 
> Ooops, you are right.
> 
> Does guest EOI still cause a trap into Xen?
It depends on the bit in EOI exit bitmap. If it is set, then EOI still will 
cause vmexit(EOI-induced vmexit). Otherwise, no vmexit happened.

The following pseudocode details the behavior of EOI virtualization:
Vector ← SVI;
VISR[Vector] ← 0;
IF any bits set in VISR
THEN SVI ← highest index of bit set in VISR
ELSE SVI ← 0;
FI;
perform PPR virtualiation
IF EOI_exit_bitmap[Vector] = 1 
THEN cause EOI-induced VM exit with Vector as exit qualification;
ELSE evaluate pending virtual interrupts; 
FI;

Best regards,
Yang

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