[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 21/22] libxc: range checks in xc_dom_p2m_host and _guest
On 12/06/13 17:06, Ian Jackson wrote: George Dunlap writes ("Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 21/22] libxc: range checks in xc_dom_p2m_host and _guest"):On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 7:21 PM, Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:These functions take guest pfns and look them up in the p2m. They did no range checking. However, some callers, notably xc_dom_boot.c:setup_hypercall_page want to pass untrusted guest-supplied value(s). It is most convenient to detect this here and return INVALID_MFN. This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx>I've taken a look at where things get returned here, and it seems like they should all be OK with INVALID_MFN.Good. Does that mean that we should promote the check to be done in the shadow_enabled case too ? Oh sorry, missed that question. I think it's safe, but you should get an ack from Tim to be sure. -George _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |