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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 8/8] libxl, hvmloader: Don't relocate memory for MMIO hole
On 20/06/13 18:38, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
On Thu, 20 Jun 2013, George Dunlap wrote:
At the moment, qemu-xen can't handle memory being relocated by
hvmloader. This may happen if a device with a large enough memory
region is passed through to the guest. At the moment, if this
happens, then at some point in the future qemu will crash and the
domain will hang. (qemu-traditional is fine.)
It's too late in the release to do a proper fix, so we try to do
damage control.
hvmloader already has mechanisms to relocate memory to 64-bit space
if it can't make a big enough MMIO hole. By default this is 2GiB; if
we just refuse to make the hole bigger if it will overlap with guest
memory, then the relocation will happen by default.
v3:
- Fix polarity of comparison
- Move diagnostic messages to another patch
- Tested with xen platform pci device hacked to have different BAR sizes
{256MiB, 1GiB} x {qemu-xen, qemu-traditional} x various memory
configurations
- Add comment explaining why we default to "allow"
- Remove cast to bool
v2:
- style fixes
- fix and expand comment on the MMIO hole loop
- use "%d" rather than "%s" -> (...)?"1":"0"
- use bool instead of uint8_t
- Move 64-bit bar relocate detection to another patch
- Add more diagnostic messages
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Hanweidong <hanweidong@xxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx>
CC: Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx>
---
tools/firmware/hvmloader/pci.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c | 6 ++++
xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_xs_strings.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/firmware/hvmloader/pci.c b/tools/firmware/hvmloader/pci.c
index 3108c8a..2364177 100644
--- a/tools/firmware/hvmloader/pci.c
+++ b/tools/firmware/hvmloader/pci.c
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
#include <xen/memory.h>
#include <xen/hvm/ioreq.h>
+#include <xen/hvm/hvm_xs_strings.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
unsigned long pci_mem_start = PCI_MEM_START;
unsigned long pci_mem_end = PCI_MEM_END;
@@ -57,6 +59,32 @@ void pci_setup(void)
} *bars = (struct bars *)scratch_start;
unsigned int i, nr_bars = 0;
+ const char *s;
+ /*
+ * Do we allow hvmloader to relocate guest memory in order to
+ * increase the size of the lowmem MMIO hole? Defaulting to 1
+ * here will mean that non-libxl toolstacks (including xend and
+ * home-grown ones) will experience this series as "no change".
+ * It does mean that those using qemu-xen will still experience
+ * the bug (described below); but it also means that those using
+ * qemu-traditional will *not* experience any change; and it also
+ * means that there is a work-around for those using qemu-xen,
+ * namely switching to qemu-traditional.
+ *
+ * If we defaulted to 0, and failing to resize the hole caused any
+ * problems with qemu-traditional, then there is no work-around.
+ *
+ * Since xend can't talk to qemu-traditional, I think this is the
+ * option that will have the least impact.
+ */
+ bool allow_memory_relocate = 1;
+
+ s = xenstore_read(HVM_XS_ALLOW_MEMORY_RELOCATE, NULL);
+ if ( s )
+ allow_memory_relocate = strtoll(s, NULL, 0);
Considering that strtoll retuns a long long, are we sure that this
allocation does what we want for all the possible long long values
that can be returned?
For example, if strtoll returns -1, do we want allow_memory_relocate to
be set to true?
The only valid values here are "0" and "1"; everything else is undefined.
Look, the bike shed is already painted, the brushes have been washed and
put away. Leave it be. :-)
+ printf("Relocating guest memory for lowmem MMIO space %s\n",
+ allow_memory_relocate?"enabled":"disabled");
+
/* Program PCI-ISA bridge with appropriate link routes. */
isa_irq = 0;
for ( link = 0; link < 4; link++ )
@@ -208,8 +236,25 @@ void pci_setup(void)
pci_writew(devfn, PCI_COMMAND, cmd);
}
- while ( (mmio_total > (pci_mem_end - pci_mem_start)) &&
- ((pci_mem_start << 1) != 0) )
+ /*
+ * At the moment qemu-xen can't deal with relocated memory regions.
+ * It's too close to the release to make a proper fix; for now,
+ * only allow the MMIO hole to grow large enough to move guest memory
+ * if we're running qemu-traditional. Items that don't fit will be
+ * relocated into the 64-bit address space.
+ *
+ * This loop now does the following:
+ * - If allow_memory_relocate, increase the MMIO hole until it's
+ * big enough, or until it's 2GiB
+ * - If !allow_memory_relocate, increase the MMIO hole until it's
+ * big enough, or until it's 2GiB, or until it overlaps guest
+ * memory
+ */
+ while ( (mmio_total > (pci_mem_end - pci_mem_start))
+ && ((pci_mem_start << 1) != 0)
+ && (allow_memory_relocate
+ || (((pci_mem_start << 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT)
+ >= hvm_info->low_mem_pgend)) )
pci_mem_start <<= 1;
if ( mmio_total > (pci_mem_end - pci_mem_start) ) {
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c
index ac1f90e..342d2ce 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c
@@ -1154,6 +1154,12 @@ void libxl__spawn_local_dm(libxl__egc *egc,
libxl__dm_spawn_state *dmss)
libxl__xs_write(gc, XBT_NULL,
libxl__sprintf(gc, "%s/hvmloader/bios", path),
"%s", libxl_bios_type_to_string(b_info->u.hvm.bios));
+ /* Disable relocating memory to make the MMIO hole larger
+ * unless we're running qemu-traditional */
+ libxl__xs_write(gc, XBT_NULL,
+ libxl__sprintf(gc,
"%s/hvmloader/allow-memory-relocate", path),
+ "%d",
+
b_info->device_model_version==LIBXL_DEVICE_MODEL_VERSION_QEMU_XEN_TRADITIONAL);
line length
Blame the person who made a *47-character* identifier.
Seriously, would you rather have the "==" on a separate line or
something? That seems really ridiculous.
I'll break the sprintf though.
-George
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