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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [xen-4.2-testing test] 18234: regressions - FAIL
flight 18234 xen-4.2-testing real [real] http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~xensrcts/logs/18234/ Regressions :-( Tests which did not succeed and are blocking, including tests which could not be run: build-i386 4 xen-build fail REGR. vs. 18207 build-i386-oldkern 4 xen-build fail REGR. vs. 18207 Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking: build-armhf 4 xen-build fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-pcipt-intel 9 guest-start fail never pass test-amd64-i386-rhel6hvm-amd 1 xen-build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-amd 1 xen-build-check(1) blocked n/a test-i386-i386-xl 1 xen-build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-intel 1 xen-build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-rhel6hvm-intel 1 xen-build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-intel 1 xen-build-check(1) blocked n/a test-i386-i386-pair 1 xen-build-check(1) blocked n/a test-i386-i386-pv 1 xen-build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-pair 1 xen-build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-pv 1 xen-build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-xl 1 xen-build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-xl-multivcpu 1 xen-build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-amd 1 xen-build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-xl-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3-vcpus1 1 xen-build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-xl-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-win7-amd64 1 xen-build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-i386-i386-xl-winxpsp3 1 xen-build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-credit2 1 xen-build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 1 xen-build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-xl-winxpsp3-vcpus1 1 xen-build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-xend-qemut-winxpsp3 1 xen-build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-xend-winxpsp3 1 xen-build-check(1) blocked n/a test-i386-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 1 xen-build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-i386-i386-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 1 xen-build-check(1) blocked n/a version targeted for testing: xen 85fac79f83f96e5a626d9d0509c1533c6320ea5c baseline version: xen 63a1ea8506d520881e4f7426b39774dce4be1ff9 ------------------------------------------------------------ People who touched revisions under test: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> ------------------------------------------------------------ jobs: build-amd64 pass build-armhf fail build-i386 fail build-amd64-oldkern pass build-i386-oldkern fail build-amd64-pvops pass build-i386-pvops pass test-amd64-amd64-xl pass test-amd64-i386-xl blocked test-i386-i386-xl blocked test-amd64-i386-rhel6hvm-amd blocked test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-amd blocked test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-amd blocked test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 blocked test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-win7-amd64 blocked test-amd64-i386-xl-credit2 blocked test-amd64-amd64-xl-pcipt-intel fail test-amd64-i386-rhel6hvm-intel blocked test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-intel blocked test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-intel blocked test-amd64-i386-xl-multivcpu blocked test-amd64-amd64-pair pass test-amd64-i386-pair blocked test-i386-i386-pair blocked test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf-pin pass test-amd64-amd64-pv pass test-amd64-i386-pv blocked test-i386-i386-pv blocked test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3-vcpus1 blocked test-amd64-i386-xl-winxpsp3-vcpus1 blocked test-amd64-i386-xend-qemut-winxpsp3 blocked test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 fail test-i386-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 blocked test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 fail test-i386-i386-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 blocked test-amd64-i386-xend-winxpsp3 blocked test-amd64-amd64-xl-winxpsp3 fail test-i386-i386-xl-winxpsp3 blocked ------------------------------------------------------------ sg-report-flight on woking.cam.xci-test.com logs: /home/xc_osstest/logs images: /home/xc_osstest/images Logs, config files, etc. are available at http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~xensrcts/logs Test harness code can be found at http://xenbits.xensource.com/gitweb?p=osstest.git;a=summary Not pushing. ------------------------------------------------------------ commit 85fac79f83f96e5a626d9d0509c1533c6320ea5c Author: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Jun 27 17:25:18 2013 +0100 libxl: Restrict permissions on PV console device xenstore nodes Matthew Daley has observed that the PV console protocol places sensitive host state into a guest writeable xenstore locations, this includes: - The pty used to communicate between the console backend daemon and its client, allowing the guest administrator to read and write arbitrary host files. - The output file, allowing the guest administrator to write arbitrary host files or to target arbitrary qemu chardevs which include sockets, udp, ptr, pipes etc (see -chardev in qemu(1) for a more complete list). - The maximum buffer size, allowing the guest administrator to consume more resources than the host administrator has configured. - The backend to use (qemu vs xenconsoled), potentially allowing the guest administrator to confuse host software. So we arrange to make the sensitive keys in the xenstore frontend directory read only for the guest. This is safe since the xenstore permissions model, unlike POSIX directory permissions, does not allow the guest to remove and recreate a node if it has write access to the containing directory. There are a few associated wrinkles: - The primary PV console is "special". It's xenstore node is not under the usual /devices/ subtree and it does not use the customary xenstore state machine protocol. Unfortunately its directory is used for other things, including the vnc-port node, which we do not want the guest to be able to write to. Rather than trying to track down all the possible secondary uses of this directory just make it r/o to the guest. All newly created subdirectories inherit these permissions and so are now safe by default. - The other serial consoles do use the customary xenstore state machine and therefore need write access to at least the "protocol" and "state" nodes, however they may also want to use arbitrary "feature-foo" nodes (although I'm not aware of any) and therefore we cannot simply lock down the entire frontend directory. Instead we add support to libxl__device_generic_add for frontend keys which are explicitly read only and use that to lock down the sensitive keys. - Minios' console frontend wants to write the "type" node, which it has no business doing since this is a host/toolstack level decision. This fails now that the node has become read only to the PV guest. Since the toolstack already writes this node just remove the attempt to set it. This is CVE-2013-2211 / XSA-57 Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> Conflicts: tools/libxl/libxl.c (no vtpm, free front_ro on error in libxl__device_console_add) (qemu changes not included) _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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