[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/1 V5] x86/AMD: Fix nested svm crash due to assertion in __virt_to_maddr
At 14:17 +0100 on 07 Aug (1375885025), Jan Beulich wrote: > >>> On 05.08.13 at 10:31, <suravee.suthikulpanit@xxxxxxx> wrote: > > From: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@xxxxxxx> > > > > Fix assertion in __virt_to_maddr when starting nested SVM guest > > in debug mode. Investigation has shown that svm_vmsave/svm_vmload > > make use of __pa() with invalid address. > > > > Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@xxxxxxx> > > Tim - have all your earlier comments been addressed in this version? Yes, I'm happy with this one. Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx> > > - if (!nestedhvm_enabled(v->domain)) { > > + if ( !nestedhvm_enabled(v->domain) || !hvm_svm_enabled(v) ) { > > Suravee, why is this change needed (here and further down)? > Can we really get here when hvm_svm_enabled(v) returns false? > I don't recall this having been there in earlier versions. This came from discussion of what fault to inject -- we always intercept VM{RUN,LOAD,SAVE} so I think we can get here. The AMD docs for those say: "Checks exceptions (#GP) before the intercept." but nothing about checking guest_efer.SVME so AFAICT we have to do that in Xen. Arguably this fix could could be a separate patch. Certainly the same check ought to go into svm_exit_do_vmrun(). Tim. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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