[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/1 V5] x86/AMD: Fix nested svm crash due to assertion in __virt_to_maddr
>>> On 12.08.13 at 13:13, "Egger, Christoph" <chegger@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 12.08.13 11:01, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>> On 12.08.13 at 10:57, "Egger, Christoph" <chegger@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> On 08.08.13 08:47, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>> In any case - explaining how nestedhvm_enabled() could end up >>>> returning a value different from hvm_svm_enabled() would help >>>> my understanding. >>> >>> nestedhvm_enabled() returns true when 'nestedhvm=1' in the >>> guest config file. >>> >>> hvm_svm_enabled() returns true when the hvm guest enabled SVM >>> in EFER. >> >> And the guest should certainly be disallowed to enable SVM in >> EFER when nestedhvm was not 1 in the config file. > > That's correct. The guest should also never see SVM available via > cpuid. > Analogous same regarding VMX on Intel. So Suravee, bottom line from this is: Replace the prior checks instead of adding the new ones. Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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