Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] VMX: XSA-60 workaround

[Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On 13/08/13 17:36, Jan Beulich wrote:

Considering that there's still no real progress towards a resolution
for XSA-60, I'd like to propose turning off the probelamtic code by
default, allowing it to be turned back on via command line option.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>

In principle, ok, but can I suggest that this initially goes in with a per domain warn once, (and perhaps gdprintk afterwards), so guests which actually try to use this can at least be identified if they suddenly start behaving weirdly?

~Andrew

--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -57,6 +57,14 @@
 #include <asm/hvm/nestedhvm.h>
 #include <asm/event.h>
 
+/*
+ * Option to allow VMX guests to run with caches disabled. This is exposing
+ * the host to DoS attacks (due to the way vmx_set_uc_mode() works), and hence
+ * needs to be disabled by default.
+ */
+static bool_t __read_mostly opt_permit_cache_disable;
+boolean_param("vmx-permit-cache-disable", opt_permit_cache_disable);
+
 enum handler_return { HNDL_done, HNDL_unhandled, HNDL_exception_raised };
 
 static void vmx_ctxt_switch_from(struct vcpu *v);
@@ -1133,6 +1141,8 @@ static void vmx_update_guest_cr(struct v
 
         v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hw_cr[0] =
             v->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[0] | hw_cr0_mask;
+        if ( !opt_permit_cache_disable )
+            v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hw_cr[0] &= ~(X86_CR0_CD | X86_CR0_NW);
         __vmwrite(GUEST_CR0, v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hw_cr[0]);
         __vmwrite(CR0_READ_SHADOW, v->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[0]);
 
@@ -1603,6 +1613,9 @@ const struct hvm_function_table * __init
         vmx_function_table.sync_pir_to_irr = NULL;
     }
 
+    if ( !opt_permit_cache_disable )
+        vmx_function_table.set_uc_mode = NULL;
+
     setup_vmcs_dump();
 
     return &vmx_function_table;

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