[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Fix boot crash on xsm/flask enabled builds when no policy module is present
>>> On 26.08.13 at 19:00, Tomasz Wroblewski <tomasz.wroblewski@xxxxxxxxxx> >>> wrote: > I've verified that replacing security_load_policy call > completely with the following allocation/deallocaiton is enough to cause > this crash: > > //ret = security_load_policy(policy_buffer, policy_size); > { > void ** p = xmalloc_array(void*, 768); > xfree(p); > } > > Note that this allocation succeeds, and also if you would not call xfree > (which is not called if say a policy was succesfully loaded), there is > no crash. So yeah my original patch accidentaly fixes it by just > avoiding the alloc/free completely. But I then understand, together with the below, that the crash isn't down the xfree() path, ... > The shaky manually constructed call graph for the assertion failure: > > setup.c: init_idle_domain > schedule.c: scheduler_init > domain.c: domain_create > domain.c: alloc_domain_struct > domain.c: alloc_xenheap_pages > .. > page_alloc.c: alloc_heap_pages > flushtlb.h: flush_tlb_mask > flushtlb.h: flush_mask > smp.c: flush_area_mask - hits ASSERT because interrupts are disabled here ... but instead is on a _subsequent_ allocation. Hence the prior free gets a heap page into a state that makes in non-suitable for re-use. But you certainly noticed that free_heap_pages() sets a page's u.free.need_tlbflush only if the page had an owner, which shouldn't be the case for Xen-internal allocations. With that, I think I can see where the bug really is: The owner field (v.inuse._domain) is in a union with the order field re-used by the xmalloc() implementation for whole page allocations. The fix therefore ought to be as simple as the patch below. Jan --- a/xen/common/xmalloc_tlsf.c +++ a/xen/common/xmalloc_tlsf.c @@ -629,6 +629,7 @@ void xfree(void *p) unsigned int i, order = get_order_from_pages(size); BUG_ON((unsigned long)p & ((PAGE_SIZE << order) - 1)); + PFN_ORDER(virt_to_page(p)) = 0; for ( i = 0; ; ++i ) { if ( !(size & (1 << i)) ) _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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