Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 3/3 V3] XSA-60 security hole: cr0.cd handling

["Jan Beulich" <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>]

>>> "Nakajima, Jun" <jun.nakajima@xxxxxxxxx> 10/23/13 6:29 PM >>>
>On Tue, Oct 22, 2013 at 7:55 AM, Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> >>> On 21.10.13 at 17:55, "Liu, Jinsong" <jinsong.liu@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> > From 4ff1e2955f67954e60562b29a00adea89e5b93ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>> > From: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@xxxxxxxxx>
>> > Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2013 05:49:23 +0800
>> > Subject: [PATCH 3/3 V3] XSA-60 security hole: cr0.cd handling
>> >
>> > This patch solves XSA-60 security hole:
>> > 1. For guest w/o VT-d, and for guest with VT-d but snooped, Xen need
>> > do nothing, since hardware snoop mechanism has ensured cache coherency.
>> >
>> > 2. For guest with VT-d but non-snooped, cache coherency can not be
>> > guaranteed by h/w snoop, therefore it need emulate UC type to guest:
>> > 2.1). if it works w/ Intel EPT, set guest IA32_PAT fields as UC so that
>> > guest memory type are all UC.
>
>Can you make sure that "setting guest IA32_PAT fields as UC" doesn't have a
>conflict with the existing (other) settings done by the guest?

I don't think I understand the question, and I also don't think I'm the right
addressee (I think you meant to send this to Jinsong and only Cc me).

Jan


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