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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86/fpu: CR0.TS should be set before trap into PV guest's #NM exception handler

2013/11/6 Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>:
>>>> On 06.11.13 at 07:41, Zhu Yanhai <zhu.yanhai@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> As we know Intel X86's CR0.TS is a sticky bit, which means once set
>> it remains set until cleared by some software routines, in other words,
>> the exception handler expects the bit is set when it starts to execute.
> Since when would that be the case? CR0.TS is entirely unaffected
> by exception invocations according to all I know. All that is known
> here is that #NM wouldn't have occurred in the first place if CR0.TS
> was clear.

Yes, you are right, nevertheless IMHO no exception handlers in the
real world do not clear this bit.

>> However xen doesn't simulate this behavior quite well for PV guests -
>> vcpu_restore_fpu_lazy() clears CR0.TS unconditionally in the very beginning,
>> so the guest kernel's #NM handler runs with CR0.TS cleared. Generally
>> speaking
>> it's fine since the linux kernel executes the exception handler with
>> interrupt disabled and a sane #NM handler will clear the bit anyway
>> before it exits, but there's a catch: if it's the first FPU trap for the
>> process,
>> the linux kernel must allocate a piece of SLAB memory for it to save
>> the FPU registers, which opens a schedule window as the memory
>> allocation might sleep -- and with CR0.TS keeps clear!
>> [see the code below in linux kernel,
> You're apparently referring to the pvops kernel.

Yes, it's from Linus tree with tag 3.11.

>> void math_state_restore(void)
>> {
>>     struct task_struct *tsk = current;
>>     if (!tsk_used_math(tsk)) {
>>         local_irq_enable();
>>         /*
>>          * does a slab alloc which can sleep
>>          */
>>         if (init_fpu(tsk)) {                 <<<< Here it might open a 
>> schedule window
>>             /*
>>              * ran out of memory!
>>              */
>>             do_group_exit(SIGKILL);
>>             return;
>>         }
>>         local_irq_disable();
>>     }
>>     __thread_fpu_begin(tsk);    <<<< Here the process gets marked as a 'fpu 
>> user'
>>                                          after the schedule window
>>     /*
>>      * Paranoid restore. send a SIGSEGV if we fail to restore the state.
>>      */
>>     if (unlikely(restore_fpu_checking(tsk))) {
>>         drop_init_fpu(tsk);
>>         force_sig(SIGSEGV, tsk);
>>         return;
>>     }
>>     tsk->fpu_counter++;
>> }
>> ]
> May I direct your attention to the XenoLinux one:
> asmlinkage void math_state_restore(void)
> {
>         struct task_struct *me = current;
>         /* NB. 'clts' is done for us by Xen during virtual trap. */
>         __get_cpu_var(xen_x86_cr0) &= ~X86_CR0_TS;
>         if (!used_math())
>                 init_fpu(me);
>         restore_fpu_checking(&me->thread.i387.fxsave);
>         task_thread_info(me)->status |= TS_USEDFPU;
> }
> Note the comment close to the beginning - the fact that CR0.TS
> is clear at exception handler entry is actually part of the PV ABI,
> i.e. by altering hypervisor behavior here you break all forward
> ported kernels.

I see, XenoLinux kernel doesn't sleep in init_fpu() so it doesn't have
this issue. But I wonder why PV ABI decide to clear this bit for the
guest kernel, isn't it better for the guest kernel itself to see bit
set? Since it's more similar with the hardware. I know the ABI cannot
be changed, just for curious.

> Nevertheless I agree that there is an issue, but this needs to be
> fixed on the Linux side (hence adding the Linux maintainers to Cc);
> this issue was introduced way back in 2.6.26 (before that there
> was no allocation on that path). It's not clear though whether
> using GFP_ATOMIC for the allocation would be preferable over
> stts() before calling the allocation function (and clts() if it
> succeeded), or whether perhaps to defer the stts() until we
> actually know the task is being switched out. It's going to be an
> ugly, Xen-specific hack in any event.

Yes, it also can be fixed at the linux kernel side. I didn't know such
behavior was part of PV ABI before.

Zhu Yanhai

> Jan

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