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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCHv11 3/9] kexec: add infrastructure for handling kexec images
Add the code needed to handle and load kexec images into Xen memory or
into the crash region. This is needed for the new KEXEC_CMD_load and
KEXEC_CMD_unload hypercall sub-ops.
Much of this code is derived from the Linux kernel.
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
xen/common/Makefile | 1 +
xen/common/kimage.c | 820 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
xen/include/xen/kimage.h | 62 ++++
3 files changed, 883 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 xen/common/kimage.c
create mode 100644 xen/include/xen/kimage.h
diff --git a/xen/common/Makefile b/xen/common/Makefile
index 686f7a1..3683ae3 100644
--- a/xen/common/Makefile
+++ b/xen/common/Makefile
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ obj-y += irq.o
obj-y += kernel.o
obj-y += keyhandler.o
obj-$(HAS_KEXEC) += kexec.o
+obj-$(HAS_KEXEC) += kimage.o
obj-y += lib.o
obj-y += memory.o
obj-y += multicall.o
diff --git a/xen/common/kimage.c b/xen/common/kimage.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cba4458
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xen/common/kimage.c
@@ -0,0 +1,820 @@
+/*
+ * Kexec Image
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Citrix Systems R&D Ltd.
+ *
+ * Derived from kernel/kexec.c from Linux:
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2004 Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
+ *
+ * This source code is licensed under the GNU General Public License,
+ * Version 2. See the file COPYING for more details.
+ */
+
+#include <xen/config.h>
+#include <xen/types.h>
+#include <xen/init.h>
+#include <xen/kernel.h>
+#include <xen/errno.h>
+#include <xen/spinlock.h>
+#include <xen/guest_access.h>
+#include <xen/mm.h>
+#include <xen/kexec.h>
+#include <xen/kimage.h>
+
+#include <asm/page.h>
+
+/*
+ * When kexec transitions to the new kernel there is a one-to-one
+ * mapping between physical and virtual addresses. On processors
+ * where you can disable the MMU this is trivial, and easy. For
+ * others it is still a simple predictable page table to setup.
+ *
+ * The code for the transition from the current kernel to the the new
+ * kernel is placed in the page-size control_code_buffer. This memory
+ * must be identity mapped in the transition from virtual to physical
+ * addresses.
+ *
+ * The assembly stub in the control code buffer is passed a linked list
+ * of descriptor pages detailing the source pages of the new kernel,
+ * and the destination addresses of those source pages. As this data
+ * structure is not used in the context of the current OS, it must
+ * be self-contained.
+ *
+ * The code has been made to work with highmem pages and will use a
+ * destination page in its final resting place (if it happens
+ * to allocate it). The end product of this is that most of the
+ * physical address space, and most of RAM can be used.
+ *
+ * Future directions include:
+ * - allocating a page table with the control code buffer identity
+ * mapped, to simplify machine_kexec and make kexec_on_panic more
+ * reliable.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * KIMAGE_NO_DEST is an impossible destination address..., for
+ * allocating pages whose destination address we do not care about.
+ */
+#define KIMAGE_NO_DEST (-1UL)
+
+/*
+ * Offset of the last entry in an indirection page.
+ */
+#define KIMAGE_LAST_ENTRY (PAGE_SIZE/sizeof(kimage_entry_t) - 1)
+
+
+static int kimage_is_destination_range(struct kexec_image *image,
+ paddr_t start, paddr_t end);
+static struct page_info *kimage_alloc_page(struct kexec_image *image,
+ paddr_t dest);
+
+static struct page_info *kimage_alloc_zeroed_page(unsigned memflags)
+{
+ struct page_info *page;
+
+ page = alloc_domheap_page(NULL, memflags);
+ if ( !page )
+ return NULL;
+
+ clear_domain_page(page_to_mfn(page));
+
+ return page;
+}
+
+static int do_kimage_alloc(struct kexec_image **rimage, paddr_t entry,
+ unsigned long nr_segments,
+ xen_kexec_segment_t *segments, uint8_t type)
+{
+ struct kexec_image *image;
+ unsigned long i;
+ int result;
+
+ /* Allocate a controlling structure */
+ result = -ENOMEM;
+ image = xzalloc(typeof(*image));
+ if ( !image )
+ goto out;
+
+ image->entry_maddr = entry;
+ image->type = type;
+ image->nr_segments = nr_segments;
+ image->segments = segments;
+
+ image->next_crash_page = kexec_crash_area.start;
+
+ INIT_PAGE_LIST_HEAD(&image->control_pages);
+ INIT_PAGE_LIST_HEAD(&image->dest_pages);
+ INIT_PAGE_LIST_HEAD(&image->unusable_pages);
+
+ /*
+ * Verify we have good destination addresses. The caller is
+ * responsible for making certain we don't attempt to load the new
+ * image into invalid or reserved areas of RAM. This just
+ * verifies it is an address we can use.
+ *
+ * Since the kernel does everything in page size chunks ensure the
+ * destination addresses are page aligned. Too many special cases
+ * crop of when we don't do this. The most insidious is getting
+ * overlapping destination addresses simply because addresses are
+ * changed to page size granularity.
+ */
+ result = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
+ for ( i = 0; i < nr_segments; i++ )
+ {
+ paddr_t mstart, mend;
+
+ mstart = image->segments[i].dest_maddr;
+ mend = mstart + image->segments[i].dest_size;
+ if ( (mstart & ~PAGE_MASK) || (mend & ~PAGE_MASK) )
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Verify our destination addresses do not overlap. If we allowed
+ * overlapping destination addresses through very weird things can
+ * happen with no easy explanation as one segment stops on
+ * another.
+ */
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ for ( i = 0; i < nr_segments; i++ )
+ {
+ paddr_t mstart, mend;
+ unsigned long j;
+
+ mstart = image->segments[i].dest_maddr;
+ mend = mstart + image->segments[i].dest_size;
+ for (j = 0; j < i; j++ )
+ {
+ paddr_t pstart, pend;
+ pstart = image->segments[j].dest_maddr;
+ pend = pstart + image->segments[j].dest_size;
+ /* Do the segments overlap? */
+ if ( (mend > pstart) && (mstart < pend) )
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure our buffer sizes are strictly less than our memory
+ * sizes. This should always be the case, and it is easier to
+ * check up front than to be surprised later on.
+ */
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ for ( i = 0; i < nr_segments; i++ )
+ {
+ if ( image->segments[i].buf_size > image->segments[i].dest_size )
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Page for the relocation code must still be accessible after the
+ * processor has switched to 32-bit mode.
+ */
+ result = -ENOMEM;
+ image->control_code_page = kimage_alloc_control_page(image, MEMF_bits(32));
+ if ( !image->control_code_page )
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Add an empty indirection page. */
+ image->entry_page = kimage_alloc_control_page(image, 0);
+ if ( !image->entry_page )
+ goto out;
+
+ image->head = page_to_maddr(image->entry_page);
+
+ result = 0;
+out:
+ if ( result == 0 )
+ *rimage = image;
+ else if ( image )
+ {
+ image->segments = NULL; /* caller frees segments after an error */
+ kimage_free(image);
+ }
+
+ return result;
+
+}
+
+static int kimage_normal_alloc(struct kexec_image **rimage, paddr_t entry,
+ unsigned long nr_segments,
+ xen_kexec_segment_t *segments)
+{
+ return do_kimage_alloc(rimage, entry, nr_segments, segments,
+ KEXEC_TYPE_DEFAULT);
+}
+
+static int kimage_crash_alloc(struct kexec_image **rimage, paddr_t entry,
+ unsigned long nr_segments,
+ xen_kexec_segment_t *segments)
+{
+ unsigned long i;
+
+ /* Verify we have a valid entry point */
+ if ( (entry < kexec_crash_area.start)
+ || (entry > kexec_crash_area.start + kexec_crash_area.size))
+ return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
+
+ /*
+ * Verify we have good destination addresses. Normally
+ * the caller is responsible for making certain we don't
+ * attempt to load the new image into invalid or reserved
+ * areas of RAM. But crash kernels are preloaded into a
+ * reserved area of ram. We must ensure the addresses
+ * are in the reserved area otherwise preloading the
+ * kernel could corrupt things.
+ */
+ for ( i = 0; i < nr_segments; i++ )
+ {
+ paddr_t mstart, mend;
+
+ if ( guest_handle_is_null(segments[i].buf.h) )
+ continue;
+
+ mstart = segments[i].dest_maddr;
+ mend = mstart + segments[i].dest_size;
+ /* Ensure we are within the crash kernel limits. */
+ if ( (mstart < kexec_crash_area.start )
+ || (mend > kexec_crash_area.start + kexec_crash_area.size))
+ return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate and initialize a controlling structure. */
+ return do_kimage_alloc(rimage, entry, nr_segments, segments,
+ KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH);
+}
+
+static int kimage_is_destination_range(struct kexec_image *image,
+ paddr_t start,
+ paddr_t end)
+{
+ unsigned long i;
+
+ for ( i = 0; i < image->nr_segments; i++ )
+ {
+ paddr_t mstart, mend;
+
+ mstart = image->segments[i].dest_maddr;
+ mend = mstart + image->segments[i].dest_size;
+ if ( (end > mstart) && (start < mend) )
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void kimage_free_page_list(struct page_list_head *list)
+{
+ struct page_info *page, *next;
+
+ page_list_for_each_safe(page, next, list)
+ {
+ page_list_del(page, list);
+ free_domheap_page(page);
+ }
+}
+
+static struct page_info *kimage_alloc_normal_control_page(
+ struct kexec_image *image, unsigned memflags)
+{
+ /*
+ * Control pages are special, they are the intermediaries that are
+ * needed while we copy the rest of the pages to their final
+ * resting place. As such they must not conflict with either the
+ * destination addresses or memory the kernel is already using.
+ *
+ * The only case where we really need more than one of these are
+ * for architectures where we cannot disable the MMU and must
+ * instead generate an identity mapped page table for all of the
+ * memory.
+ *
+ * At worst this runs in O(N) of the image size.
+ */
+ struct page_list_head extra_pages;
+ struct page_info *page = NULL;
+
+ INIT_PAGE_LIST_HEAD(&extra_pages);
+
+ /*
+ * Loop while I can allocate a page and the page allocated is a
+ * destination page.
+ */
+ do {
+ unsigned long mfn, emfn;
+ paddr_t addr, eaddr;
+
+ page = kimage_alloc_zeroed_page(memflags);
+ if ( !page )
+ break;
+ mfn = page_to_mfn(page);
+ emfn = mfn + 1;
+ addr = page_to_maddr(page);
+ eaddr = addr + PAGE_SIZE;
+ if ( kimage_is_destination_range(image, addr, eaddr) )
+ {
+ page_list_add(page, &extra_pages);
+ page = NULL;
+ }
+ } while ( !page );
+
+ if ( page )
+ {
+ /* Remember the allocated page... */
+ page_list_add(page, &image->control_pages);
+
+ /*
+ * Because the page is already in it's destination location we
+ * will never allocate another page at that address.
+ * Therefore kimage_alloc_page will not return it (again) and
+ * we don't need to give it an entry in image->segments[].
+ */
+ }
+ /*
+ * Deal with the destination pages I have inadvertently allocated.
+ *
+ * Ideally I would convert multi-page allocations into single page
+ * allocations, and add everything to image->dest_pages.
+ *
+ * For now it is simpler to just free the pages.
+ */
+ kimage_free_page_list(&extra_pages);
+
+ return page;
+}
+
+static struct page_info *kimage_alloc_crash_control_page(struct kexec_image
*image)
+{
+ /*
+ * Control pages are special, they are the intermediaries that are
+ * needed while we copy the rest of the pages to their final
+ * resting place. As such they must not conflict with either the
+ * destination addresses or memory the kernel is already using.
+ *
+ * Control pages are also the only pags we must allocate when
+ * loading a crash kernel. All of the other pages are specified
+ * by the segments and we just memcpy into them directly.
+ *
+ * The only case where we really need more than one of these are
+ * for architectures where we cannot disable the MMU and must
+ * instead generate an identity mapped page table for all of the
+ * memory.
+ *
+ * Given the low demand this implements a very simple allocator
+ * that finds the first hole of the appropriate size in the
+ * reserved memory region, and allocates all of the memory up to
+ * and including the hole.
+ */
+ paddr_t hole_start, hole_end;
+ struct page_info *page = NULL;
+
+ hole_start = PAGE_ALIGN(image->next_crash_page);
+ hole_end = hole_start + PAGE_SIZE;
+ while ( hole_end <= kexec_crash_area.start + kexec_crash_area.size )
+ {
+ unsigned long i;
+
+ /* See if I overlap any of the segments. */
+ for ( i = 0; i < image->nr_segments; i++ )
+ {
+ paddr_t mstart, mend;
+
+ mstart = image->segments[i].dest_maddr;
+ mend = mstart + image->segments[i].dest_size;
+ if ( (hole_end > mstart) && (hole_start < mend) )
+ {
+ /* Advance the hole to the end of the segment. */
+ hole_start = PAGE_ALIGN(mend);
+ hole_end = hole_start + PAGE_SIZE;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ /* If I don't overlap any segments I have found my hole! */
+ if ( i == image->nr_segments )
+ {
+ page = maddr_to_page(hole_start);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if ( page )
+ {
+ image->next_crash_page = hole_end;
+ clear_domain_page(page_to_mfn(page));
+ }
+
+ return page;
+}
+
+
+struct page_info *kimage_alloc_control_page(struct kexec_image *image,
+ unsigned memflags)
+{
+ struct page_info *pages = NULL;
+
+ switch ( image->type )
+ {
+ case KEXEC_TYPE_DEFAULT:
+ pages = kimage_alloc_normal_control_page(image, memflags);
+ break;
+ case KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH:
+ pages = kimage_alloc_crash_control_page(image);
+ break;
+ }
+ return pages;
+}
+
+static int kimage_add_entry(struct kexec_image *image, kimage_entry_t entry)
+{
+ kimage_entry_t *entries;
+
+ if ( image->next_entry == KIMAGE_LAST_ENTRY )
+ {
+ struct page_info *page;
+
+ page = kimage_alloc_page(image, KIMAGE_NO_DEST);
+ if ( !page )
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ entries = __map_domain_page(image->entry_page);
+ entries[image->next_entry] = page_to_maddr(page) | IND_INDIRECTION;
+ unmap_domain_page(entries);
+
+ image->entry_page = page;
+ image->next_entry = 0;
+ }
+
+ entries = __map_domain_page(image->entry_page);
+ entries[image->next_entry] = entry;
+ image->next_entry++;
+ unmap_domain_page(entries);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int kimage_set_destination(struct kexec_image *image,
+ paddr_t destination)
+{
+ return kimage_add_entry(image, (destination & PAGE_MASK) |
IND_DESTINATION);
+}
+
+
+static int kimage_add_page(struct kexec_image *image, paddr_t maddr)
+{
+ return kimage_add_entry(image, (maddr & PAGE_MASK) | IND_SOURCE);
+}
+
+
+static void kimage_free_extra_pages(struct kexec_image *image)
+{
+ kimage_free_page_list(&image->dest_pages);
+ kimage_free_page_list(&image->unusable_pages);
+}
+
+static void kimage_terminate(struct kexec_image *image)
+{
+ kimage_entry_t *entries;
+
+ entries = __map_domain_page(image->entry_page);
+ entries[image->next_entry] = IND_DONE;
+ unmap_domain_page(entries);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Iterate over all the entries in the indirection pages.
+ *
+ * Call unmap_domain_page(ptr) after the loop exits.
+ */
+#define for_each_kimage_entry(image, ptr, entry) \
+ for ( ptr = map_domain_page(image->head >> PAGE_SHIFT); \
+ (entry = *ptr) && !(entry & IND_DONE); \
+ ptr = (entry & IND_INDIRECTION) ? \
+ (unmap_domain_page(ptr), map_domain_page(entry >> PAGE_SHIFT)) \
+ : ptr + 1 )
+
+static void kimage_free_entry(kimage_entry_t entry)
+{
+ struct page_info *page;
+
+ page = mfn_to_page(entry >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+ free_domheap_page(page);
+}
+
+static void kimage_free_all_entries(struct kexec_image *image)
+{
+ kimage_entry_t *ptr, entry;
+ kimage_entry_t ind = 0;
+
+ if ( !image->head )
+ return;
+
+ for_each_kimage_entry(image, ptr, entry)
+ {
+ if ( entry & IND_INDIRECTION )
+ {
+ /* Free the previous indirection page */
+ if ( ind & IND_INDIRECTION )
+ kimage_free_entry(ind);
+ /* Save this indirection page until we are done with it. */
+ ind = entry;
+ }
+ else if ( entry & IND_SOURCE )
+ kimage_free_entry(entry);
+ }
+ unmap_domain_page(ptr);
+
+ /* Free the final indirection page. */
+ if ( ind & IND_INDIRECTION )
+ kimage_free_entry(ind);
+}
+
+void kimage_free(struct kexec_image *image)
+{
+ if ( !image )
+ return;
+
+ kimage_free_extra_pages(image);
+ kimage_free_all_entries(image);
+ kimage_free_page_list(&image->control_pages);
+ xfree(image->segments);
+ xfree(image);
+}
+
+static kimage_entry_t *kimage_dst_used(struct kexec_image *image,
+ paddr_t maddr)
+{
+ kimage_entry_t *ptr, entry;
+ unsigned long destination = 0;
+
+ for_each_kimage_entry(image, ptr, entry)
+ {
+ if ( entry & IND_DESTINATION )
+ destination = entry & PAGE_MASK;
+ else if ( entry & IND_SOURCE )
+ {
+ if ( maddr == destination )
+ return ptr;
+ destination += PAGE_SIZE;
+ }
+ }
+ unmap_domain_page(ptr);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static struct page_info *kimage_alloc_page(struct kexec_image *image,
+ paddr_t destination)
+{
+ /*
+ * Here we implement safeguards to ensure that a source page is
+ * not copied to its destination page before the data on the
+ * destination page is no longer useful.
+ *
+ * To do this we maintain the invariant that a source page is
+ * either its own destination page, or it is not a destination
+ * page at all.
+ *
+ * That is slightly stronger than required, but the proof that no
+ * problems will not occur is trivial, and the implementation is
+ * simply to verify.
+ *
+ * When allocating all pages normally this algorithm will run in
+ * O(N) time, but in the worst case it will run in O(N^2) time.
+ * If the runtime is a problem the data structures can be fixed.
+ */
+ struct page_info *page;
+ paddr_t addr;
+
+ /*
+ * Walk through the list of destination pages, and see if I have a
+ * match.
+ */
+ page_list_for_each(page, &image->dest_pages)
+ {
+ addr = page_to_maddr(page);
+ if ( addr == destination )
+ {
+ page_list_del(page, &image->dest_pages);
+ return page;
+ }
+ }
+ page = NULL;
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ kimage_entry_t *old;
+
+ /* Allocate a page, if we run out of memory give up. */
+ page = kimage_alloc_zeroed_page(0);
+ if ( !page )
+ return NULL;
+ addr = page_to_maddr(page);
+
+ /* If it is the destination page we want use it. */
+ if ( addr == destination )
+ break;
+
+ /* If the page is not a destination page use it. */
+ if ( !kimage_is_destination_range(image, addr,
+ addr + PAGE_SIZE) )
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * I know that the page is someones destination page. See if
+ * there is already a source page for this destination page.
+ * And if so swap the source pages.
+ */
+ old = kimage_dst_used(image, addr);
+ if ( old )
+ {
+ /* If so move it. */
+ unsigned long old_mfn = *old >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ unsigned long mfn = addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+ copy_domain_page(mfn, old_mfn);
+ clear_domain_page(old_mfn);
+ *old = (addr & ~PAGE_MASK) | IND_SOURCE;
+ unmap_domain_page(old);
+
+ page = mfn_to_page(old_mfn);
+ break;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * Place the page on the destination list; I will use it
+ * later.
+ */
+ page_list_add(page, &image->dest_pages);
+ }
+ }
+ return page;
+}
+
+static int kimage_load_normal_segment(struct kexec_image *image,
+ xen_kexec_segment_t *segment)
+{
+ unsigned long to_copy;
+ unsigned long src_offset;
+ paddr_t dest, end;
+ int ret;
+
+ to_copy = segment->buf_size;
+ src_offset = 0;
+ dest = segment->dest_maddr;
+
+ ret = kimage_set_destination(image, dest);
+ if ( ret < 0 )
+ return ret;
+
+ while ( to_copy )
+ {
+ unsigned long dest_mfn;
+ struct page_info *page;
+ void *dest_va;
+ size_t size;
+
+ dest_mfn = dest >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+ size = min_t(unsigned long, PAGE_SIZE, to_copy);
+
+ page = kimage_alloc_page(image, dest);
+ if ( !page )
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ ret = kimage_add_page(image, page_to_maddr(page));
+ if ( ret < 0 )
+ return ret;
+
+ dest_va = __map_domain_page(page);
+ ret = copy_from_guest_offset(dest_va, segment->buf.h, src_offset,
size);
+ unmap_domain_page(dest_va);
+ if ( ret )
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ to_copy -= size;
+ src_offset += size;
+ dest += PAGE_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ /* Remainder of the destination should be zeroed. */
+ end = segment->dest_maddr + segment->dest_size;
+ for ( ; dest < end; dest += PAGE_SIZE )
+ kimage_add_entry(image, IND_ZERO);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int kimage_load_crash_segment(struct kexec_image *image,
+ xen_kexec_segment_t *segment)
+{
+ /*
+ * For crash dumps kernels we simply copy the data from user space
+ * to it's destination.
+ */
+ paddr_t dest;
+ unsigned long sbytes, dbytes;
+ int ret = 0;
+ unsigned long src_offset = 0;
+
+ sbytes = segment->buf_size;
+ dbytes = segment->dest_size;
+ dest = segment->dest_maddr;
+
+ while ( dbytes )
+ {
+ unsigned long dest_mfn;
+ void *dest_va;
+ size_t schunk, dchunk;
+
+ dest_mfn = dest >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+ dchunk = PAGE_SIZE;
+ schunk = min(dchunk, sbytes);
+
+ dest_va = map_domain_page(dest_mfn);
+ if ( !dest_va )
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = copy_from_guest_offset(dest_va, segment->buf.h, src_offset,
schunk);
+ memset(dest_va + schunk, 0, dchunk - schunk);
+
+ unmap_domain_page(dest_va);
+ if ( ret )
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ dbytes -= dchunk;
+ sbytes -= schunk;
+ dest += dchunk;
+ src_offset += schunk;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int kimage_load_segment(struct kexec_image *image, xen_kexec_segment_t
*segment)
+{
+ int result = -ENOMEM;
+
+ if ( !guest_handle_is_null(segment->buf.h) )
+ {
+ switch ( image->type )
+ {
+ case KEXEC_TYPE_DEFAULT:
+ result = kimage_load_normal_segment(image, segment);
+ break;
+ case KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH:
+ result = kimage_load_crash_segment(image, segment);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+int kimage_alloc(struct kexec_image **rimage, uint8_t type, uint16_t arch,
+ uint64_t entry_maddr,
+ uint32_t nr_segments, xen_kexec_segment_t *segment)
+{
+ int result;
+
+ switch( type )
+ {
+ case KEXEC_TYPE_DEFAULT:
+ result = kimage_normal_alloc(rimage, entry_maddr, nr_segments,
segment);
+ break;
+ case KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH:
+ result = kimage_crash_alloc(rimage, entry_maddr, nr_segments, segment);
+ break;
+ default:
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ if ( result < 0 )
+ return result;
+
+ (*rimage)->arch = arch;
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+int kimage_load_segments(struct kexec_image *image)
+{
+ int s;
+ int result;
+
+ for ( s = 0; s < image->nr_segments; s++ ) {
+ result = kimage_load_segment(image, &image->segments[s]);
+ if ( result < 0 )
+ return result;
+ }
+ kimage_terminate(image);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Local variables:
+ * mode: C
+ * c-file-style: "BSD"
+ * c-basic-offset: 4
+ * tab-width: 4
+ * indent-tabs-mode: nil
+ * End:
+ */
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/kimage.h b/xen/include/xen/kimage.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0ebd37a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xen/include/xen/kimage.h
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+#ifndef __XEN_KIMAGE_H__
+#define __XEN_KIMAGE_H__
+
+#define IND_DESTINATION 0x1
+#define IND_INDIRECTION 0x2
+#define IND_DONE 0x4
+#define IND_SOURCE 0x8
+#define IND_ZERO 0x10
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+#include <xen/list.h>
+#include <xen/mm.h>
+#include <public/kexec.h>
+
+#define KEXEC_SEGMENT_MAX 16
+
+typedef paddr_t kimage_entry_t;
+
+struct kexec_image {
+ uint8_t type;
+ uint16_t arch;
+ uint64_t entry_maddr;
+ uint32_t nr_segments;
+ xen_kexec_segment_t *segments;
+
+ kimage_entry_t head;
+ struct page_info *entry_page;
+ unsigned next_entry;
+
+ struct page_info *control_code_page;
+ struct page_info *aux_page;
+
+ struct page_list_head control_pages;
+ struct page_list_head dest_pages;
+ struct page_list_head unusable_pages;
+
+ /* Address of next control page to allocate for crash kernels. */
+ paddr_t next_crash_page;
+};
+
+int kimage_alloc(struct kexec_image **rimage, uint8_t type, uint16_t arch,
+ uint64_t entry_maddr,
+ uint32_t nr_segments, xen_kexec_segment_t *segment);
+void kimage_free(struct kexec_image *image);
+int kimage_load_segments(struct kexec_image *image);
+struct page_info *kimage_alloc_control_page(struct kexec_image *image,
+ unsigned memflags);
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#endif /* __XEN_KIMAGE_H__ */
+
+/*
+ * Local variables:
+ * mode: C
+ * c-file-style: "BSD"
+ * c-basic-offset: 4
+ * tab-width: 4
+ * indent-tabs-mode: nil
+ * End:
+ */
--
1.7.2.5
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