[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/2] common/kexec: Prevent deadlock on reentry to the crash path.
On 15/11/2013 20:32, Andrew Cooper wrote: > In some cases, such as suffering a queued-invalidation timeout while > performing an iommu_crash_shutdown(), Xen can end up reentering the crash > path. Previously, this would result in a deadlock in one_cpu_only(), as the > test_and_set_bit() would fail. > > The crash path is not reentrant, and even if it could be made to be so, it is > almost certain that we would fall over the same reentry condition again. > > The new code can distinguish a reentry case from multiple cpus racing down the > crash path. In the case that a reentry is detected, return back out to the > nested panic() call, which will maybe_reboot() on our behalf. This requires a > bit of return plumbing back up to kexec_crash(). > > While fixing this deadlock, also fix up an minor niggle seen recently from a > XenServer crash report. The report was from a Bank 8 MCE, which had managed > to crash on all cpus at once. The result was a lot of stack traces with cpus > in kexec_common_shutdown(), which was infact the inlined version of > one_cpu_only(). The kexec crash path is not a hotpath, so we can easily > afford to prevent inlining for the sake of clarity in the stack traces. > > Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> > CC: Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx> > CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> > CC: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx> > CC: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@xxxxxxxxxx> David _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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