[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 3/4 V3] X86: MPX IA32_BNDCFGS msr handle
On 27/11/13 13:50, Liu, Jinsong wrote: > From 291adaf4ad6174c5641a7239c1801373e92e9975 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > From: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@xxxxxxxxx> > Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2013 05:26:06 +0800 > Subject: [PATCH 3/4 V3] X86: MPX IA32_BNDCFGS msr handle > > When MPX supported, a new guest-state field for IA32_BNDCFGS > is added to the VMCS. In addition, two new controls are added: > - a VM-exit control called "clear BNDCFGS" > - a VM-entry control called "load BNDCFGS." > VM exits always save IA32_BNDCFGS into BNDCFGS field of VMCS. > > Signed-off-by: Xudong Hao <xudong.hao@xxxxxxxxx> > Reviewed-by: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@xxxxxxxxx> > > Unlikely, but in case VMX support is not available, not expose > MPX to hvm guest. You are still missing the point. I as the administrator choose to prevent an HVM guest from using MPX. Perhaps I want to create a heterogeneous pool. Therefore, the bit is disabled in the domains cpuid policy, despite being available on the hardware. ~Andrew > > Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> > Suggested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> > Signed-off-by: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@xxxxxxxxx> > --- > xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 6 ++++++ > xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c | 8 ++++++-- > xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h | 2 ++ > xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 2 ++ > xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h | 2 ++ > 5 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c > index 9c88c73..0f7178b 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c > @@ -2905,6 +2905,12 @@ void hvm_cpuid(unsigned int input, unsigned int *eax, > unsigned int *ebx, > if ( (count == 0) && !cpu_has_smep ) > *ebx &= ~cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMEP); > > + /* Don't expose MPX to hvm when VMX support is not available */ > + if ( (count == 0) && > + (!(vmx_vmexit_control & VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS) || > + !(vmx_vmentry_control & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS)) ) > + *ebx &= ~cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_MPX); > + > /* Don't expose INVPCID to non-hap hvm. */ > if ( (count == 0) && !hap_enabled(d) ) > *ebx &= ~cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID); > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c > index 290b42f..4a1f168 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c > @@ -270,7 +270,8 @@ static int vmx_init_vmcs_config(void) > } > > min = VM_EXIT_ACK_INTR_ON_EXIT; > - opt = VM_EXIT_SAVE_GUEST_PAT | VM_EXIT_LOAD_HOST_PAT; > + opt = VM_EXIT_SAVE_GUEST_PAT | VM_EXIT_LOAD_HOST_PAT | > + VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS; > min |= VM_EXIT_IA32E_MODE; > _vmx_vmexit_control = adjust_vmx_controls( > "VMExit Control", min, opt, MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS, &mismatch); > @@ -284,7 +285,7 @@ static int vmx_init_vmcs_config(void) > _vmx_pin_based_exec_control &= ~ PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTERRUPT; > > min = 0; > - opt = VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_PAT; > + opt = VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_PAT | VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS; > _vmx_vmentry_control = adjust_vmx_controls( > "VMEntry Control", min, opt, MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS, &mismatch); > > @@ -955,6 +956,9 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v) > vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, MSR_TYPE_R | > MSR_TYPE_W); > if ( paging_mode_hap(d) && (!iommu_enabled || iommu_snoop) ) > vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, MSR_TYPE_R | > MSR_TYPE_W); > + if ( (vmexit_ctl & VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS) && > + (vmentry_ctl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS) ) > + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS, MSR_TYPE_R | > MSR_TYPE_W); > } > > /* I/O access bitmap. */ > diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h > b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h > index 1cfaf94..930dc9b 100644 > --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h > +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h > @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ > #define X86_FEATURE_INVPCID (7*32+10) /* Invalidate Process Context ID */ > #define X86_FEATURE_RTM (7*32+11) /* Restricted Transactional Memory */ > #define X86_FEATURE_NO_FPU_SEL (7*32+13) /* FPU CS/DS stored as zero */ > +#define X86_FEATURE_MPX (7*32+14) /* Memory Protection > Extensions */ > #define X86_FEATURE_SMAP (7*32+20) /* Supervisor Mode Access Prevention > */ > > #define cpu_has(c, bit) test_bit(bit, (c)->x86_capability) > @@ -197,6 +198,7 @@ > #define cpu_has_xsave boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) > #define cpu_has_avx boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX) > #define cpu_has_lwp boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LWP) > +#define cpu_has_mpx boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MPX) > > #define cpu_has_arch_perfmon boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON) > > diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h > b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h > index ebaba5c..75cd653 100644 > --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h > +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h > @@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ extern u32 vmx_pin_based_exec_control; > #define VM_EXIT_SAVE_GUEST_EFER 0x00100000 > #define VM_EXIT_LOAD_HOST_EFER 0x00200000 > #define VM_EXIT_SAVE_PREEMPT_TIMER 0x00400000 > +#define VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS 0x00800000 > extern u32 vmx_vmexit_control; > > #define VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE 0x00000200 > @@ -194,6 +195,7 @@ extern u32 vmx_vmexit_control; > #define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL 0x00002000 > #define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_PAT 0x00004000 > #define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_EFER 0x00008000 > +#define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS 0x00010000 > extern u32 vmx_vmentry_control; > > #define SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES 0x00000001 > diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h > index e597a28..ccad1ab 100644 > --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h > +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h > @@ -56,6 +56,8 @@ > #define MSR_IA32_DS_AREA 0x00000600 > #define MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES 0x00000345 > > +#define MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS 0x00000D90 > + > #define MSR_MTRRfix64K_00000 0x00000250 > #define MSR_MTRRfix16K_80000 0x00000258 > #define MSR_MTRRfix16K_A0000 0x00000259 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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