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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] VMX: wbinvd when vmentry under UC
- To: "Andrew Cooper" <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
- From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 29 Nov 2013 15:04:10 +0000
- Cc: Jinsong Liu <jinsong.liu@xxxxxxxxx>, "keir@xxxxxxx" <keir@xxxxxxx>, "suravee.suthikulpanit@xxxxxxx" <suravee.suthikulpanit@xxxxxxx>, "tim@xxxxxxx" <tim@xxxxxxx>, Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@xxxxxxxxx>, "zhenzhong.duan@xxxxxxxxxx" <zhenzhong.duan@xxxxxxxxxx>, Donald D Dugger <donald.d.dugger@xxxxxxxxx>, "xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Will Auld <will.auld@xxxxxxxxx>, Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@xxxxxxxxx>, "sherry.hurwitz@xxxxxxx" <sherry.hurwitz@xxxxxxx>, Xiantao Zhang <xiantao.zhang@xxxxxxxxx>
- Delivery-date: Fri, 29 Nov 2013 15:04:23 +0000
- List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xen.org>
>>> On 29.11.13 at 15:50, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Given that PCIPassthrough realistically involves requiring trusting the
> guest administrator,
Why? As long as the passed through device isn't buggy, there
shouldn't be any risk associated with handing it to the guest
(once we managed to fix all respective software bugs).
Jan
> it might be feasible to have another iommu= option
> of "allow passthough even without snoop".
>
> ~Andrew
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