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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v5 12/17] xen/libxc: sched: DOMCTL_*vcpuaffinity works with hard and soft affinity
>>> On 03.12.13 at 19:21, George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 12/03/2013 10:06 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 03.12.13 at 11:02, "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>>> On 02.12.13 at 19:29, Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>> + goto setvcpuaffinity_out;
>>>> +
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * We both set a new affinity and report back to the caller
> what
>>>> + * the scheduler will be effectively using.
>>>> + */
>>>> + if ( vcpuaff->flags & XEN_VCPUAFFINITY_HARD )
>>>> + {
>>>> + ret = xenctl_bitmap_to_bitmap(cpumask_bits(new_affinity),
>>>> + &vcpuaff->cpumap_hard,
>>>> +
>>>> vcpuaff->cpumap_hard.nr_bits);
>>>
>>> There's no code above range checking vcpuaff->cpumap_hard.nr_bits,
>>> yet xenctl_bitmap_to_bitmap() uses the passed in value to write into
>>> the array pointed to by the first argument. Why is this not
>>> xenctl_bitmap_to_cpumask() in the first place?
>>
>> And just to make it explicit - with fundamental flaws like this, I'm
>> not certain anymore whether we really ought to rush this series
>> in for 4.4.
>
> I'm certainly getting nervous about the prospect. However, the above
> bug would only be triggered by bad input from domain 0, right? I suppose
> even that would be a potential security issue in a highly disaggregated
> environment.
>
> Other bugs in this patch would be similar. This path is taken on domain
> creation IIUC; so bugs in this particular patch would probably either be
> unexpected behavior of the affinities, or failure to handle unusual
> input from a trusted source (domain 0).
Now that XSA-77 went out, I can properly respond to this: With
disaggregation (as said above), the problem isn't limited to Dom0.
While XSA-77 declares all such issues non-security ones for the
time being, we should strive to avoid introducing new similar issues.
Jan
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