[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2] libxl: disallow PCI device assignment for HVM guest when PoD is enabled
On 14/01/14 14:50, Ian Campbell wrote: > On Mon, 2014-01-13 at 11:52 +0000, Wei Liu wrote: >> This replicates a Xend behavior, see ec789523749 ("xend: Dis-allow >> device assignment if PoD is enabled."). >> >> This change is restricted to HVM guest, as only HVM is relevant in the >> counterpart in Xend. We're late in release cycle so the change should >> only do what's necessary. Probably we can revisit it if we need to do >> the same thing for PV guest in the future. >> >> Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> > Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> > > Release hat: The risk here is of a false positive detecting whether PoD > would be used and therefore refusing to start a domain. However Wei > directed me earlier on to the code in setup_guest which sets > XENMEMF_populate_on_demand and I believe it is using the same logic. > > The benefit of this is that it will stop people starting a domain in an > invalid configuration -- but what is the downside here? Is it an > unhandled IOMMU fault or another host-fatal error? That would make the > argument for taking this patch pretty strong. On the other hand if the > failure were simply to kill this domain, that would be a less serious > issue and I'd be in two minds, mainly due to George not being here to > confirm that the pod_enabled logic is correct (although if he were here > I wouldn't be wrestling with this question at all ;-)). > > I'm leaning towards taking this fix, but I'd really like to know what > the current failure case looks like. > > Ian. The answer is likely hardware specific. An IOMMU fault (however handled by Xen) will result in a master abort on the DMA transaction for the PCI device which has suffered the fault. That device can then do anything from continue blindly to issuing an NMI IOCK/SERR which will likely be fatal to the entire server. ~Andrew _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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