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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/3] VT-d: suppress UR signaling for server chipsets



>>> On 07.04.14 at 14:12, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 03/04/14 10:39, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> Unspported Requests can be signaled for malformed writes to the MSI
>> address region, e.g. due to buggy or malicious DMA set up to that
>> region. These should normally result in IOMMU faults, but don't on
>> the server chipsets dealt with here.
>>
>> IDs 0xe00, 0xe01, and 0xe04 ... 0xe0b (Ivytown) aren't needed here -
>> Intel confirmed the issue to be fixed in hardware there.
>>
>> This is CVE-2013-3495 / XSA-59.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
>>
>> --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c
>> +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c
>> @@ -390,12 +390,67 @@ void __init pci_vtd_quirk(struct pci_dev
>>      int bus = pdev->bus;
>>      int dev = PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn);
>>      int func = PCI_FUNC(pdev->devfn);
>> -    int id, val;
>> +    int pos;
>> +    u32 val;
>>  
>> -    id = pci_conf_read32(seg, bus, dev, func, 0);
>> -    if ( id == 0x342e8086 || id == 0x3c288086 )
>> +    if ( pci_conf_read16(seg, bus, dev, func, PCI_VENDOR_ID) != 0x8086 )
> 
> Can this using the new PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL?

Yes, it could. The patch simply predates that addition by many months.
Plus a little more care will be needed during the backport. But I guess
I'll do it anyway.

Jan


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