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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86/HVM: consolidate and sanitize CR4 guest reserved bit determination



On 20/06/14 13:45, Jan Beulich wrote:
First of all, this is needed by just a single source file, so it gets
moved there instead of getting fed to the compiler for most other
source files too. With that it becomes sensible for this to no longer
be a macro, allowing elimination of the mostly redundant helpers
hvm_vcpu_has_{smep,smap}(). And finally, following the model SMEP and
SMAP already used, tie the determination of reserved bits to the
features the guest is shown rather than the host's.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>

Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>

Doing this was somewhere moderately high on my todo list.


--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -1723,6 +1723,75 @@ static bool_t hvm_efer_valid(struct doma
              ((value & (EFER_LME|EFER_LMA)) == EFER_LMA));
 }
 
+/* These reserved bits in lower 32 remain 0 after any load of CR0 */
+#define HVM_CR0_GUEST_RESERVED_BITS             \
+    (~((unsigned long)                          \
+       (X86_CR0_PE | X86_CR0_MP | X86_CR0_EM |  \
+        X86_CR0_TS | X86_CR0_ET | X86_CR0_NE |  \
+        X86_CR0_WP | X86_CR0_AM | X86_CR0_NW |  \
+        X86_CR0_CD | X86_CR0_PG)))
+
+/* These bits in CR4 cannot be set by the guest. */
+static unsigned long hvm_cr4_guest_reserved_bits(const struct vcpu *v,
+                                                 bool_t restore)
+{
+    unsigned int leaf1_ecx = 0, leaf1_edx = 0;
+    unsigned int leaf7_0_ebx = 0, leaf7_0_ecx = 0;
+
+    if ( likely(!restore) )
+    {
+        unsigned int level;
+
+        ASSERT(v == current);
+        hvm_cpuid(0, &level, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+        if ( level >= 1 )
+            hvm_cpuid(1, NULL, NULL, &leaf1_ecx, &leaf1_edx);
+        if ( level >= 7 )
+            hvm_cpuid(7, NULL, &leaf7_0_ebx, &leaf7_0_ecx, NULL);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        leaf1_edx = boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[X86_FEATURE_VME / 32];
+        leaf1_ecx = boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[X86_FEATURE_PCID / 32];
+        leaf7_0_ebx = boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE / 32];
+    }
+
+    return ~(unsigned long)
+            ((leaf1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_VME) ?
+              X86_CR4_VME | X86_CR4_PVI : 0) |
+             (leaf1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_TSC) ?
+              X86_CR4_TSD : 0) |
+             (leaf1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_DE) ?
+              X86_CR4_DE : 0) |
+             (leaf1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_PSE) ?
+              X86_CR4_PSE : 0) |
+             (leaf1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_PAE) ?
+              X86_CR4_PAE : 0) |
+             (leaf1_edx & (cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_MCE) |
+                           cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_MCA)) ?
+              X86_CR4_MCE : 0) |
+             (leaf1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_PGE) ?
+              X86_CR4_PGE : 0) |
+             X86_CR4_PCE |
+             (leaf1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_FXSR) ?
+              X86_CR4_OSFXSR : 0) |
+             (leaf1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_XMM) ?
+              X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT : 0) |
+             ((restore || nestedhvm_enabled(v->domain)) &&
+              (leaf1_ecx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_VMXE)) ?
+              X86_CR4_VMXE : 0) |
+             (leaf7_0_ebx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE) ?
+              X86_CR4_FSGSBASE : 0) |
+             (leaf1_ecx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_PCID) ?
+              X86_CR4_PCIDE : 0) |
+             (leaf1_ecx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) ?
+              X86_CR4_OSXSAVE : 0) |
+             (leaf7_0_ebx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMEP) ?
+              X86_CR4_SMEP : 0) |
+             (leaf7_0_ebx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMAP) ?
+              X86_CR4_SMAP : 0));
+}
+
 static int hvm_load_cpu_ctxt(struct domain *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h)
 {
     int vcpuid;
@@ -1753,7 +1822,7 @@ static int hvm_load_cpu_ctxt(struct doma
         return -EINVAL;
     }
 
-    if ( ctxt.cr4 & HVM_CR4_GUEST_RESERVED_BITS(v, 1) )
+    if ( ctxt.cr4 & hvm_cr4_guest_reserved_bits(v, 1) )
     {
         printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "HVM%d restore: bad CR4 %#" PRIx64 "\n",
                d->domain_id, ctxt.cr4);
@@ -3185,7 +3254,7 @@ int hvm_set_cr4(unsigned long value)
     struct vcpu *v = current;
     unsigned long old_cr;
 
-    if ( value & HVM_CR4_GUEST_RESERVED_BITS(v, 0) )
+    if ( value & hvm_cr4_guest_reserved_bits(v, 0) )
     {
         HVM_DBG_LOG(DBG_LEVEL_1,
                     "Guest attempts to set reserved bit in CR4: %lx",
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
@@ -367,67 +367,10 @@ static inline int hvm_event_pending(stru
     return hvm_funcs.event_pending(v);
 }
 
-static inline bool_t hvm_vcpu_has_smep(void)
-{
-    unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx = 0;
-
-    hvm_cpuid(0, &eax, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-
-    if ( eax < 7 )
-        return 0;
-
-    hvm_cpuid(7, NULL, &ebx, &ecx, NULL);
-    return !!(ebx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMEP));
-}
-
-static inline bool_t hvm_vcpu_has_smap(void)
-{
-    unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx = 0;
-
-    hvm_cpuid(0, &eax, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-
-    if ( eax < 7 )
-        return 0;
-
-    hvm_cpuid(7, NULL, &ebx, &ecx, NULL);
-    return !!(ebx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMAP));
-}
-
-/* These reserved bits in lower 32 remain 0 after any load of CR0 */
-#define HVM_CR0_GUEST_RESERVED_BITS             \
-    (~((unsigned long)                          \
-       (X86_CR0_PE | X86_CR0_MP | X86_CR0_EM |  \
-        X86_CR0_TS | X86_CR0_ET | X86_CR0_NE |  \
-        X86_CR0_WP | X86_CR0_AM | X86_CR0_NW |  \
-        X86_CR0_CD | X86_CR0_PG)))
-
 /* These bits in CR4 are owned by the host. */
 #define HVM_CR4_HOST_MASK (mmu_cr4_features & \
     (X86_CR4_VMXE | X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_MCE))
 
-/* These bits in CR4 cannot be set by the guest. */
-#define HVM_CR4_GUEST_RESERVED_BITS(v, restore) ({      \
-    const struct vcpu *_v = (v);                        \
-    bool_t _restore = !!(restore);                      \
-    ASSERT((_restore) || _v == current);                \
-    (~((unsigned long)                                  \
-       (X86_CR4_VME | X86_CR4_PVI | X86_CR4_TSD |       \
-        X86_CR4_DE  | X86_CR4_PSE | X86_CR4_PAE |       \
-        X86_CR4_MCE | X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PCE |       \
-        X86_CR4_OSFXSR | X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT |           \
-        (((_restore) ? cpu_has_smep :                   \
-                       hvm_vcpu_has_smep()) ?           \
-         X86_CR4_SMEP : 0) |                            \
-        (((_restore) ? cpu_has_smap :                   \
-                       hvm_vcpu_has_smap()) ?           \
-         X86_CR4_SMAP : 0) |                            \
-        (cpu_has_fsgsbase ? X86_CR4_FSGSBASE : 0) |     \
-        ((nestedhvm_enabled(_v->domain) && cpu_has_vmx) \
-                      ? X86_CR4_VMXE : 0)  |            \
-        (cpu_has_pcid ? X86_CR4_PCIDE : 0) |            \
-        (cpu_has_xsave ? X86_CR4_OSXSAVE : 0))));       \
-})
-
 /* These exceptions must always be intercepted. */
 #define HVM_TRAP_MASK ((1U << TRAP_machine_check) | (1U << TRAP_invalid_op))
 




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