[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH RFC 3/9] xen: Force-enable relevant MSR events; optimize the number of sent MSR events
On 07/02/2014 06:43 PM, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>> On 02.07.14 at 17:35, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> On 02/07/14 14:33, Razvan Cojocaru wrote: >>> @@ -700,6 +700,25 @@ void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu *v, u32 >>> msr, int type) >>> if ( msr_bitmap == NULL ) >>> return; >>> >>> + /* Filter out MSR-s needed by the memory introspection engine */ >>> + switch ( msr ) >>> + { >>> + case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP: >>> + case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP: >>> + case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS: >>> + case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL: >>> + case MSR_STAR: >>> + case MSR_LSTAR: >>> + >> >> Given the performance implications of forcing interception of these >> MSRs, it would be gated on mem_access being active for the domain. > > Absolutely. Unfortunately the call to vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr() happens _very_ early, and by the time our application gets to enable mem_access on the domain, the interception for these MSRs has already been disabled, with unacceptable consequences. I've tested this with an "if ( mem_event_check_ring(&d->mem_event->access) )" test. Also, ideally we'd like to be able to start monitoring an already started domain, and in that case the mem_access test would be useless even considering a workaround for the case above. Thanks, Razvan Cojocaru _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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