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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH RFC V9 4/5] xen, libxc: Request page fault injection via libxc

>>> On 01.09.14 at 13:54, <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 09/01/2014 12:08 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 01.09.14 at 09:36, <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> On 08/29/2014 12:27 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>>>> On 29.08.14 at 09:44, <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>> I do understand the preference for a VCPU-based mechanism from a
>>>>> concurrency point of view, but that would simply potentially fail for
>>>>> us, hence defeating the purpose of the patch. I'm also not sure how that
>>>>> would be useful in the general case either, since the same problem that
>>>>> applies to us would seem to apply to the general case as well.
>>>> Yeah, the whole thing probably needs a bit more thinking so that the
>>>> interface doesn't end up being a BitDefender-special. Indeed together
>>>> with the address space qualification, the interface might not be very
>>>> useful when made vCPU-bound. And taking it a little further into the
>>>> "generic" direction, allowing this to only inject #PF doesn't make a
>>>> very nice interface either. Plus we already have HVMOP_inject_trap,
>>>> i.e. your first line of thinking (and eventual explaining as the
>>>> motivation for a patch) should be why that can't be used.
>>> I'd say that it's memory-introspection specific rather than 3rd-party
>>> vendor specific. Without this this patch, memory-introspection support
>>> in general is impacted / less flexible, since there's no other way to
>>> bring swapped out pages back in.
>>> For all the reasons you've explained (at least as far as I understand
>>> it) there's not much room to go more generic - so maybe just renaming
>>> the libxc wrapper to something more specific (
>>> xc_domain_request_usermode_pagefault?) is the solution here?
>> Maybe, but only after you explained why the existing interface can
>> neither be used nor suitably extended.
> As far as I understand the HVMOP_inject_trap interface, it is simply (in
> this case) a way to trigger the equivalent of hvm_inject_page_fault()
> from userspace (via libxc).
> We need two additional checks:
> 1. That CR3 matches, because the way the application works, we need to
> inject a page fault related to the address space of whatever process is
> interesting at the time, and
> 2. That we're in usermode (the CPL check), because we know that it's
> safe to inject a page fault when we're in user mode, but it's not always
> safe to do so in kernel mode.
> The current interface seems to be a low-level, basic wrapper around
> hvm_inject_trap().
> What we're trying to do is ask for a page fault when we're both A) in
> usermode, and B) when a target process matches - and are only interested
> in page faults, no other trap vector.
> Technically, the checks could, probably, be moved into (and new
> parameters added to) hvm_inject_trap() & friends, but it seems unlikely
> that users other than memory introspection applications would be
> interested in them, while they would possibly add to the complexity of
> the interface. The rest of the clients would have to carry dummy
> parameters around to use it.

I'm not sure: Injecting faults with certain restrictions (like in your
case CPL and CR3) does seem to make quite some sense in
general when the fault isn't intended to be terminal (of a process
or the entire VM). It's just that so far we used fault injection only
to indicate error conditions.

But as always - let's see if others are of differing opinion before
settling on either route.


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