[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH RFC/WIPv2 1/6] Introduce XENMEM_transfer operation
On 24/09/14 16:13, Vitaly Kuznetsov wrote: > Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> writes: > >> On 24/09/14 15:20, Vitaly Kuznetsov wrote: >>> New operation reassigns pages from one domain to the other mapping them >>> at exactly the same GFNs in the destination domain. Pages mapped more >>> than once (e.g. granted pages) are being copied. >>> >>> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@xxxxxxxxxx> >>> --- >>> xen/common/memory.c | 178 >>> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >>> xen/include/public/memory.h | 32 +++++++- >>> 2 files changed, 209 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >>> >>> diff --git a/xen/common/memory.c b/xen/common/memory.c >>> index 2e3225d..653e117 100644 >>> --- a/xen/common/memory.c >>> +++ b/xen/common/memory.c >>> @@ -578,6 +578,180 @@ static long >>> memory_exchange(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_memory_exchange_t) arg) >>> return rc; >>> } >>> >>> +static long memory_transfer(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_memory_transfer_t) >>> arg) >>> +{ >>> + long rc = 0; >>> + struct xen_memory_transfer trans; >>> + struct domain *source_d, *dest_d; >>> + unsigned long mfn, gmfn, last_gmfn; >>> + p2m_type_t p2mt; >>> + struct page_info *page, *new_page; >>> + char *sp, *dp; >>> + int copying; >>> + >>> + if ( copy_from_guest(&trans, arg, 1) ) >>> + return -EFAULT; >>> + >>> + source_d = rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id(trans.source_domid); >>> + if ( source_d == NULL ) >>> + { >>> + rc = -ESRCH; >>> + goto fail_early; >>> + } >>> + >>> + if ( source_d->is_dying ) >>> + { >>> + rc = -EINVAL; >>> + rcu_unlock_domain(source_d); >>> + goto fail_early; >>> + } >>> + >>> + dest_d = rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id(trans.dest_domid); >>> + if ( dest_d == NULL ) >>> + { >>> + rc = -ESRCH; >>> + rcu_unlock_domain(source_d); >>> + goto fail_early; >>> + } >>> + >>> + if ( dest_d->is_dying ) >>> + { >>> + rc = -EINVAL; >>> + goto fail; >>> + } >>> + >>> + last_gmfn = trans.gmfn_start + trans.gmfn_count; >>> + for ( gmfn = trans.gmfn_start; gmfn < last_gmfn; gmfn++ ) >>> + { >>> + page = get_page_from_gfn(source_d, gmfn, &p2mt, 0); >>> + if ( !page ) >>> + { >>> + continue; >>> + } >>> + >>> + mfn = page_to_mfn(page); >>> + if ( !mfn_valid(mfn) ) >>> + { >>> + put_page(page); >>> + continue; >>> + } >>> + >>> + copying = 0; >>> + >>> + if ( is_xen_heap_mfn(mfn) ) >>> + { >>> + put_page(page); >>> + continue; >>> + } >>> + >>> + /* Page table always worth copying */ >>> + if ( (page->u.inuse.type_info & PGT_l4_page_table) || >>> + (page->u.inuse.type_info & PGT_l3_page_table) || >>> + (page->u.inuse.type_info & PGT_l2_page_table) || >>> + (page->u.inuse.type_info & PGT_l1_page_table) ) >>> + copying = 1; >> How can copying pagetables like this ever work? You will end up with an >> L4 belonging to the new domain pointing to L3's owned by the old domain. >> >> Even if you change the ownership of the pages pointed to by the L1's, as >> soon as the old domain is torn down, the new domains pagetables will be >> freed heap pages. > Yes, I'm aware it is broken and that's actually why I sent this RFC - in > my PATCH 0/6 letter the main question was: what's the best approach here > with regards to PV? If we want to avoid copying and updating this pages > we can do it while killing the original domain (so instead of this > _transfer op we'll have special 'domain kill' op). Ah - I had not taken that meaning from your 0/6. Xen has no knowledge whatsoever of a PV domains p2m table (other than holding a reference to it for toolstack/domain use). This knowledge lives exclusively in the toolstack and guest. As a result, I would say that a hypercall like this cannot possibly be made to work for PV guests without some PV architectural changes in Xen. ~Andrew _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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