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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v19 08/12] xl/remus: cmdline switch to explicitly enable unsafe configurations



Ian Campbell writes ("Re: [PATCH v19 08/12] xl/remus: cmdline switch to 
explicitly enable unsafe configurations"):
> On Wed, 2014-09-24 at 11:00 -0700, Shriram Rajagopalan wrote:
> > This needs to be at libxl level because other users of the
> > libxl_Remus_domain_start API could potentially invoke it with
> > net/buffer disabled, with the assumption that such a config would
> > still provide the desired HA semantics. The libxl level unsafe option
> > forces the caller to explicitly acknowledge that he/she is aware of
> > the consequences. Whether the caller is xl or libvirt or someone else,
> > it doesn't matter.

Fair enough.

> > FYI, there is literally no prep work in xl (in safe config). Given
> > that the whole Remus api is now asynchronous, other users of libxl can
> > invoke Remus on a domain with equal ease as xl.

Indeed.

> Would "allow_unsafe" or "force_unsafe" be a more accurate name?

Probably, yes.  Thanks.

Ian.

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