Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2] x86/HVM: make hvm_efer_valid() honor guest features

[Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On 12/01/15 08:00, Jan Beulich wrote:
> Following the earlier similar change validating CR4 modifications.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>

Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>

> ---
> v2: consider CR0.PG during restore when checking EFER.LMA
>
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> @@ -1672,20 +1672,53 @@ static int hvm_save_cpu_ctxt(struct doma
>      return 0;
>  }
>  
> -static bool_t hvm_efer_valid(struct domain *d,
> -                             uint64_t value, uint64_t efer_validbits)
> +static bool_t hvm_efer_valid(const struct vcpu *v, uint64_t value,
> +                             signed int cr0_pg)
>  {
> -    if ( nestedhvm_enabled(d) && cpu_has_svm )
> -        efer_validbits |= EFER_SVME;
> +    unsigned int ext1_ecx = 0, ext1_edx = 0;
>  
> -    return !((value & ~efer_validbits) ||
> -             ((sizeof(long) != 8) && (value & EFER_LME)) ||
> -             (!cpu_has_svm && (value & EFER_SVME)) ||
> -             (!cpu_has_nx && (value & EFER_NX)) ||
> -             (!cpu_has_syscall && (value & EFER_SCE)) ||
> -             (!cpu_has_lmsl && (value & EFER_LMSLE)) ||
> -             (!cpu_has_ffxsr && (value & EFER_FFXSE)) ||
> -             ((value & (EFER_LME|EFER_LMA)) == EFER_LMA));
> +    if ( cr0_pg < 0 && !is_hardware_domain(v->domain) )
> +    {
> +        unsigned int level;
> +
> +        ASSERT(v == current);
> +        hvm_cpuid(0x80000000, &level, NULL, NULL, NULL);
> +        if ( level >= 0x80000001 )
> +            hvm_cpuid(0x80000001, NULL, NULL, &ext1_ecx, &ext1_edx);
> +    }
> +    else
> +    {
> +        ext1_edx = boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[X86_FEATURE_LM / 32];
> +        ext1_ecx = boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[X86_FEATURE_SVM / 32];
> +    }
> +
> +    if ( (value & EFER_SCE) &&
> +         !(ext1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL)) )
> +        return 0;
> +
> +    if ( (value & (EFER_LME | EFER_LMA)) &&
> +         !(ext1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_LM)) )
> +        return 0;
> +
> +    if ( cr0_pg > 0 && (value & EFER_LMA) && (!(value & EFER_LME) || 
> !cr0_pg) )
> +        return 0;
> +
> +    if ( (value & EFER_NX) && !(ext1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_NX)) )
> +        return 0;
> +
> +    if ( (value & EFER_SVME) &&
> +         (!(ext1_ecx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SVM)) ||
> +          !nestedhvm_enabled(v->domain)) )
> +        return 0;
> +
> +    if ( (value & EFER_LMSLE) && !cpu_has_lmsl )
> +        return 0;
> +
> +    if ( (value & EFER_FFXSE) &&
> +         !(ext1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_FFXSR)) )
> +        return 0;
> +
> +    return 1;
>  }
>  
>  /* These reserved bits in lower 32 remain 0 after any load of CR0 */
> @@ -1763,7 +1796,6 @@ static int hvm_load_cpu_ctxt(struct doma
>      struct vcpu *v;
>      struct hvm_hw_cpu ctxt;
>      struct segment_register seg;
> -    uint64_t efer_validbits;
>  
>      /* Which vcpu is this? */
>      vcpuid = hvm_load_instance(h);
> @@ -1794,9 +1826,7 @@ static int hvm_load_cpu_ctxt(struct doma
>          return -EINVAL;
>      }
>  
> -    efer_validbits = EFER_FFXSE | EFER_LMSLE | EFER_LME | EFER_LMA
> -                   | EFER_NX | EFER_SCE;
> -    if ( !hvm_efer_valid(d, ctxt.msr_efer, efer_validbits) )
> +    if ( !hvm_efer_valid(v, ctxt.msr_efer, MASK_EXTR(ctxt.cr0, X86_CR0_PG)) )
>      {
>          printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "HVM%d restore: bad EFER %#" PRIx64 "\n",
>                 d->domain_id, ctxt.msr_efer);
> @@ -2936,12 +2966,10 @@ err:
>  int hvm_set_efer(uint64_t value)
>  {
>      struct vcpu *v = current;
> -    uint64_t efer_validbits;
>  
>      value &= ~EFER_LMA;
>  
> -    efer_validbits = EFER_FFXSE | EFER_LMSLE | EFER_LME | EFER_NX | EFER_SCE;
> -    if ( !hvm_efer_valid(v->domain, value, efer_validbits) )
> +    if ( !hvm_efer_valid(v, value, -1) )
>      {
>          gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Trying to set reserved bit in "
>                   "EFER: %#"PRIx64"\n", value);
>
>
>


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