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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] misc/xenmicrocode: Upload /lib/firmware/<some blob> to the hypervisor
- To: "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2015 18:34:23 +0000
- Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>, Michal Marek <mmarek@xxxxxxx>, Jason Douglas <jdouglas@xxxxxxxx>, stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, Takashi Iwai <tiwai@xxxxxxx>, mcgrof@xxxxxxxx, Henrique de Moraes Holschuh <hmh@xxxxxxxxxx>, david.vrabel@xxxxxxxxxx, Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx, Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>, Olaf Hering <ohering@xxxxxxx>
- Delivery-date: Thu, 29 Jan 2015 18:34:24 +0000
- List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xen.org>
<snip>
Getting this conversation back on topic.
The current state of play in Xen is this:
* Boot time microcode loading exists (by scanning uncompressed cpio
multiboot modules) and should be safe to use.
* The facility for runtime microcode loading exists (via privileged
hypercall), but is unsafe to use at present, especially if virtual
machines are running. There are several steps which can be taken to
make it safer to use.
There is a plausible usecase for runtime microcode loading for people
who wish to take that risk, and as such, xenmicrocode is useful utility
to have, but it should probably not be available by default until we
believe the hypervisor side of the interface avoids the known potholes.
~Andrew
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