[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86/nmi: Fix shootdown of pcpus running in VMX non-root mode
>>> On 09.02.15 at 12:52, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 09/02/15 11:43, Tim Deegan wrote: >> Hi, >> >> At 11:25 +0000 on 09 Feb (1423477508), Andrew Cooper wrote: >>> In the case of a crash, nmi_shootdown_cpus() patches nmi_crash() into the > IDT >>> of each processor, such that the next NMI it receives will force it into the >>> crash path. >>> >>> c/s 7dd3b06ff "vmx: fix handling of NMI VMEXIT" fixed one issue but >>> inadvertently introduced another. The original use of self_nmi() would > follow >>> vector #2, but a direct call to do_nmi() does not. >>> >>> Introduce a function pointer which should be used in preference to direct >>> do_nmi() calls, which is updated on the crash path to point at > do_nmi_crash() >>> >>> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> >>> CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> >>> CC: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx> >>> >>> --- >>> >>> This patch very certainly functions correctly (it is in active use now in a >>> customer escalation), but I was wondering how paranoid we should be about >>> interleaved reads/writes and whether an atomic write would be better? >>> Performance is not a issue at all but in a crash senario we don't want to be >>> taking any chances with correctness. >> Yes, atomic updates sound like a good idea. Would it make sense to >> add a _get_gate() or similar so the vmx path can read the actual IDT >> rather than adding a _third_ place where we set what to do on NMI? > > A _get_gate() would return nmi() or nmi_crash() rather than do_nmi() or > do_nmi_crash(). The latter pair is needed as we are already executing > in C context rather than coming straight in from an interrupt. So wouldn't it be possible to get rid of nmi_crash() and have nmi() call *nmi_handler instead of don_nmi (and nmi_handler would really just become an alias of exception_table[2]? Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |