[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v18 07/16] x86/VPMU: Initialize PMU for PV(H) guests
>>> On 20.02.15 at 17:15, <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 02/20/2015 09:35 AM, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>> On 16.02.15 at 23:26, <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c >>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c >>> @@ -437,6 +437,8 @@ int vcpu_initialise(struct vcpu *v) >>> vmce_init_vcpu(v); >>> } >>> >>> + spin_lock_init(&v->arch.vpmu.vpmu_lock); >> This would rather seem to belong into vpmu_initialize(). > > vpmu_initialize() is called under this lock so we can't do this. Yes, I saw that later on, but it still doesn't look well structured. Can't you bail early from vpmu_initialize() the first time through for PV(H) guests, rather than guarding the HVM invocations with is_hvm_...()? >>> +static int pvpmu_init(struct domain *d, xen_pmu_params_t *params) >>> +{ >>> + struct vcpu *v; >>> + struct vpmu_struct *vpmu; >>> + struct page_info *page; >>> + uint64_t gfn = params->val; >>> + >>> + if ( vpmu_mode == XENPMU_MODE_OFF ) >>> + return -EINVAL; >>> + >>> + if ( (params->vcpu >= d->max_vcpus) || (d->vcpu == NULL) || >>> + (d->vcpu[params->vcpu] == NULL) ) >>> + return -EINVAL; >>> + >>> + if ( v->arch.vpmu.xenpmu_data ) >>> + return -EINVAL; >>> + >>> + page = get_page_from_gfn(d, gfn, NULL, P2M_ALLOC); >>> + if ( !page ) >>> + return -EINVAL; >>> + >>> + if ( !get_page_type(page, PGT_writable_page) ) >>> + { >>> + put_page(page); >>> + return -EINVAL; >>> + } >>> + >>> + v = d->vcpu[params->vcpu]; >>> + vpmu = vcpu_vpmu(v); >>> + spin_lock(&vpmu->vpmu_lock); >>> + >>> + v->arch.vpmu.xenpmu_data = __map_domain_page_global(page); >>> + if ( !v->arch.vpmu.xenpmu_data ) >>> + { >>> + put_page_and_type(page); >>> + spin_unlock(&vpmu->vpmu_lock); >>> + return -EINVAL; >>> + } >>> + >>> + vpmu_initialise(v); >>> + >>> + spin_unlock(&vpmu->vpmu_lock); >> So what is this lock guarding against here? Certainly not overwriting >> of a non-NULL v->arch.vpmu.xenpmu_data (and hence leaking a >> page reference)... > > This is trying to protect a race with pvmu_finish() that could clear > xenpmu_data. > > (I actually think you were the one who suggested it). But it should also protect against a second pvpmu_init() on another pCPU. Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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