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[Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/2] x86/vMSI-X: honor all mask requests

Commit 74fd0036de ("x86: properly handle MSI-X unmask operation from
guests") didn't go far enough: it fixed an issue with unmasking, but
left an issue with masking in place: Due to the (late) point in time
when qemu requests the hypervisor to set up MSI-X interrupts (which is
where the MMIO intercept gets put in place), the hypervisor doesn't
see all guest writes, and hence shouldn't make assumptions on the state
the virtual MSI-X resources are in. Bypassing the rest of the logic on
a guest mask operation leads to

[00:04.0] pci_msix_write: Error: Can't update msix entry 1 since MSI-X is 
already enabled.

which surprisingly enough doesn't lead to the device not working
anymore (I didn't dig in deep enough to figure out why that is). But it
does prevent the IRQ to be migrated inside the guest, i.e. all
interrupts will always arrive in vCPU 0.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>

--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c
@@ -286,11 +286,11 @@ static int msixtbl_write(struct vcpu *v,
         goto out;
-    /* exit to device model if address/data has been modified */
-    if ( test_and_clear_bit(nr_entry, &entry->table_flags) )
+    /* Exit to device model when unmasking and address/data got modified. */
+    if ( !(val & PCI_MSIX_VECTOR_BITMASK) &&
+         test_and_clear_bit(nr_entry, &entry->table_flags) )
-        if ( !(val & PCI_MSIX_VECTOR_BITMASK) )
-            v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hvm_io.msix_unmask_address = address;
+        v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hvm_io.msix_unmask_address = address;
         goto out;

Attachment: x86-vMSI-X-honor-masking.patch
Description: Text document

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