[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] Xen-unstable-staging: Xen BUG at iommu_map.c:455
Saturday, April 11, 2015, 8:25:52 PM, you wrote: > On 11/04/15 18:42, Sander Eikelenboom wrote: >> Saturday, April 11, 2015, 7:35:57 PM, you wrote: >> >>> On 11/04/15 18:25, Sander Eikelenboom wrote: >>>> Saturday, April 11, 2015, 6:38:17 PM, you wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 11/04/15 17:32, Andrew Cooper wrote: >>>>>> On 11/04/15 17:21, Sander Eikelenboom wrote: >>>>>>> Saturday, April 11, 2015, 4:21:56 PM, you wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 11/04/15 15:11, Sander Eikelenboom wrote: >>>>>>>>> Friday, April 10, 2015, 8:55:27 PM, you wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 10/04/15 11:24, Sander Eikelenboom wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> Hi Andrew, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Finally got some time to figure this out .. and i have narrowed it >>>>>>>>>>> down to: >>>>>>>>>>> git://xenbits.xen.org/staging/qemu-upstream-unstable.git >>>>>>>>>>> commit 7665d6ba98e20fb05c420de947c1750fd47e5c07 "Xen: Use the >>>>>>>>>>> ioreq-server API when available" >>>>>>>>>>> A straight revert of this commit prevents the issue from happening. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> The reason i had a hard time figuring this out was: >>>>>>>>>>> - I wasn't aware of this earlier, since git pulling the main xen >>>>>>>>>>> tree, doesn't >>>>>>>>>>> auto update the qemu-* trees. >>>>>>>>>> This has caught me out so many times. It is very non-obvious >>>>>>>>>> behaviour. >>>>>>>>>>> - So i happen to get this when i cloned a fresh tree to try to >>>>>>>>>>> figure out the >>>>>>>>>>> other issue i was seeing. >>>>>>>>>>> - After that checking out previous versions of the main xen tree >>>>>>>>>>> didn't resolve >>>>>>>>>>> this new issue, because the qemu tree doesn't get auto updated >>>>>>>>>>> and is set >>>>>>>>>>> "master". >>>>>>>>>>> - Cloning a xen-stable-4.5.0 made it go away .. because that has a >>>>>>>>>>> specific >>>>>>>>>>> git://xenbits.xen.org/staging/qemu-upstream-unstable.git tag >>>>>>>>>>> which is not >>>>>>>>>>> master. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> *sigh* >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> This is tested with xen main tree at last commit >>>>>>>>>>> 3a28f760508fb35c430edac17a9efde5aff6d1d5 >>>>>>>>>>> (normal xen-unstable, not the staging branch) >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Ok so i have added some extra debug info (see attached diff) and >>>>>>>>>>> this is the >>>>>>>>>>> output when it crashes due to something the commit above triggered, >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> level is out of bounds and the pfn looks fishy too. >>>>>>>>>>> Complete serial log from both bad and good (specific commit >>>>>>>>>>> reverted) are >>>>>>>>>>> attached. >>>>>>>>>> Just to confirm, you are positively identifying a qemu changeset as >>>>>>>>>> causing this crash? >>>>>>>>>> If so, the qemu change has discovered a pre-existing issue in the >>>>>>>>>> toolstack pci-passthrough interface. Whatever qemu is or isn't >>>>>>>>>> doing, >>>>>>>>>> it should not be able to cause a crash like this. >>>>>>>>>> With this in mind, I need to brush up on my AMD-Vi details. >>>>>>>>>> In the meantime, can you run with the following patch to identify >>>>>>>>>> what >>>>>>>>>> is going on, domctl wise? I assume it is the assign_device which is >>>>>>>>>> failing, but it will be nice to observe the differences between the >>>>>>>>>> working and failing case, which might offer a hint. >>>>>>>>> Hrrm with your patch i end up with a fatal page fault in >>>>>>>>> iommu_do_pci_domctl: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:31.833] ----[ Xen-4.6-unstable x86_64 >>>>>>>>> debug=y Tainted: C ]---- >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:31.857] CPU: 5 >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:31.868] RIP: e008:[<ffff82d08014c52c>] >>>>>>>>> iommu_do_pci_domctl+0x2dc/0x740 >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:31.894] RFLAGS: 0000000000010256 CONTEXT: >>>>>>>>> hypervisor >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:31.915] rax: 0000000000000008 rbx: >>>>>>>>> 0000000000000800 rcx: ffffffffffebe5ed >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:31.942] rdx: 0000000000000800 rsi: >>>>>>>>> 0000000000000000 rdi: ffff830256ef7e38 >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:31.968] rbp: ffff830256ef7c98 rsp: >>>>>>>>> ffff830256ef7c08 r8: 00000000deadbeef >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:31.995] r9: 00000000deadbeef r10: >>>>>>>>> ffff82d08024e500 r11: 0000000000000282 >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.022] r12: 0000000000000000 r13: >>>>>>>>> 0000000000000008 r14: 0000000000000000 >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.049] r15: 0000000000000000 cr0: >>>>>>>>> 0000000080050033 cr4: 00000000000006f0 >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.076] cr3: 00000002336a6000 cr2: >>>>>>>>> 0000000000000000 >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.096] ds: 0000 es: 0000 fs: 0000 gs: >>>>>>>>> 0000 ss: e010 cs: e008 >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.121] Xen stack trace from >>>>>>>>> rsp=ffff830256ef7c08: >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.141] ffff830256ef7c78 ffff82d08012c178 >>>>>>>>> ffff830256ef7c28 ffff830256ef7c28 >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.168] 0000000000000010 0000000000000000 >>>>>>>>> 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.195] 00000000000006f0 00007fe300000000 >>>>>>>>> ffff830256eb7790 ffff83025cc6d300 >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.222] ffff82d080330c60 00007fe396bab004 >>>>>>>>> 0000000000000000 00007fe396bab004 >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.249] 0000000000000000 0000000000000005 >>>>>>>>> ffff830256ef7ca8 ffff82d08014900b >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.276] ffff830256ef7d98 ffff82d080161f2d >>>>>>>>> 0000000000000010 0000000000000000 >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.303] 0000000000000000 ffff830256ef7ce8 >>>>>>>>> ffff82d08018b655 ffff830256ef7d48 >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.330] ffff830256ef7cf8 ffff82d08018b66a >>>>>>>>> ffff830256ef7d38 ffff82d08012925e >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.357] ffff830256efc068 0000000800000001 >>>>>>>>> 800000022e12c167 0000000000000000 >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.384] 0000000000000002 ffff830256ef7e38 >>>>>>>>> 0000000800000000 800000022e12c167 >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.411] 0000000000000003 ffff830256ef7db8 >>>>>>>>> 0000000000000000 00007fe396780eb0 >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.439] 0000000000000202 ffffffffffffffff >>>>>>>>> 0000000000000000 00007fe396bab004 >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.466] 0000000000000000 0000000000000005 >>>>>>>>> ffff830256ef7ef8 ffff82d08010497f >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.493] 0000000000000001 0000000000100001 >>>>>>>>> 800000022e12c167 ffff88001f7ecc00 >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.520] 00007fe396780eb0 ffff88001c849508 >>>>>>>>> 0000000e00000007 ffffffff8105594a >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.547] 000000000000e033 0000000000000202 >>>>>>>>> ffff88001ece3d40 000000000000e02b >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.574] ffff830256ef7e28 ffff82d080194933 >>>>>>>>> 000000000000beef ffffffff81bd6c85 >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.601] ffff830256ef7f08 ffff82d080193edd >>>>>>>>> 0000000b0000002d 0000000000000001 >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.628] 0000000100000800 00007fe3962abbd0 >>>>>>>>> ffff000a81050001 00007fe39656ce6e >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.655] 00007ffdf2a654f0 00007fe39656d0c9 >>>>>>>>> 00007fe39656ce6e 00007fe3969a9a55 >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.682] Xen call trace: >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.695] [<ffff82d08014c52c>] >>>>>>>>> iommu_do_pci_domctl+0x2dc/0x740 >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.718] [<ffff82d08014900b>] >>>>>>>>> iommu_do_domctl+0x17/0x1a >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.739] [<ffff82d080161f2d>] >>>>>>>>> arch_do_domctl+0x2469/0x26e1 >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.762] [<ffff82d08010497f>] >>>>>>>>> do_domctl+0x1a1f/0x1d60 >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.783] [<ffff82d080234c6b>] >>>>>>>>> syscall_enter+0xeb/0x145 >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.804] >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.813] Pagetable walk from 0000000000000000: >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.831] L4[0x000] = 0000000234075067 >>>>>>>>> 000000000001f2a8 >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.852] L3[0x000] = 0000000229ad4067 >>>>>>>>> 0000000000014c49 >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.873] L2[0x000] = 0000000000000000 >>>>>>>>> ffffffffffffffff >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.894] >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.903] >>>>>>>>> **************************************** >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.922] Panic on CPU 5: >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.935] FATAL PAGE FAULT >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.948] [error_code=0000] >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.961] Faulting linear address: >>>>>>>>> 0000000000000000 >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.981] >>>>>>>>> **************************************** >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:33.000] >>>>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:33.009] Reboot in five seconds... >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The RIP resolves to the prink added by your patch in: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> case XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device: >>>>>>>>> ret = xsm_test_assign_device(XSM_HOOK, >>>>>>>>> domctl->u.assign_device.machine_sbdf); >>>>>>>>> if ( ret ) >>>>>>>>> break; >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> seg = domctl->u.assign_device.machine_sbdf >> 16; >>>>>>>>> bus = (domctl->u.assign_device.machine_sbdf >> 8) & 0xff; >>>>>>>>> devfn = domctl->u.assign_device.machine_sbdf & 0xff; >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> printk("*** %pv->d%d: >>>>>>>>> test_assign_device({%04x:%02x:%02x.%u})\n", >>>>>>>>> current, d->domain_id, >>>>>>>>> seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn)); >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> if ( device_assigned(seg, bus, devfn) ) >>>>>>>>> { >>>>>>>>> printk(XENLOG_G_INFO >>>>>>>>> "%04x:%02x:%02x.%u already assigned, or >>>>>>>>> non-existent\n", >>>>>>>>> seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn)); >>>>>>>>> ret = -EINVAL; >>>>>>>>> } >>>>>>>>> break; >>>>>>>> hmm - 'd' is NULL. This ought to work better. >>>>>>>> diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c >>>>>>>> b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c >>>>>>>> index 9f3413c..85ff1fc 100644 >>>>>>>> --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c >>>>>>>> +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c >>>>>>>> @@ -1532,6 +1532,11 @@ int iommu_do_pci_domctl( >>>>>>>> max_sdevs = domctl->u.get_device_group.max_sdevs; >>>>>>>> sdevs = domctl->u.get_device_group.sdev_array; >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> + printk("*** %pv->d%d: get_device_group({%04x:%02x:%02x.%u, >>>>>>>> %u})\n", >>>>>>>> + current, d->domain_id, >>>>>>>> + seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn), >>>>>>>> + max_sdevs); >>>>>>>> + >>>>>>>> ret = iommu_get_device_group(d, seg, bus, devfn, sdevs, >>>>>>>> max_sdevs); >>>>>>>> if ( ret < 0 ) >>>>>>>> { >>>>>>>> @@ -1558,6 +1563,9 @@ int iommu_do_pci_domctl( >>>>>>>> bus = (domctl->u.assign_device.machine_sbdf >> 8) & 0xff; >>>>>>>> devfn = domctl->u.assign_device.machine_sbdf & 0xff; >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> + printk("*** %pv: test_assign_device({%04x:%02x:%02x.%u})\n", >>>>>>>> + current, seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn)); >>>>>>>> + >>>>>>>> if ( device_assigned(seg, bus, devfn) ) >>>>>>>> { >>>>>>>> printk(XENLOG_G_INFO >>>>>>>> @@ -1582,6 +1590,10 @@ int iommu_do_pci_domctl( >>>>>>>> bus = (domctl->u.assign_device.machine_sbdf >> 8) & 0xff; >>>>>>>> devfn = domctl->u.assign_device.machine_sbdf & 0xff; >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> + printk("*** %pv->d%d: assign_device({%04x:%02x:%02x.%u})\n", >>>>>>>> + current, d->domain_id, >>>>>>>> + seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn)); >>>>>>>> + >>>>>>>> ret = device_assigned(seg, bus, devfn) ?: >>>>>>>> assign_device(d, seg, bus, devfn); >>>>>>>> if ( ret == -ERESTART ) >>>>>>>> @@ -1604,6 +1616,10 @@ int iommu_do_pci_domctl( >>>>>>>> bus = (domctl->u.assign_device.machine_sbdf >> 8) & 0xff; >>>>>>>> devfn = domctl->u.assign_device.machine_sbdf & 0xff; >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> + printk("*** %pv->d%d: deassign_device({%04x:%02x:%02x.%u})\n", >>>>>>>> + current, d->domain_id, >>>>>>>> + seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn)); >>>>>>>> + >>>>>>>> spin_lock(&pcidevs_lock); >>>>>>>> ret = deassign_device(d, seg, bus, devfn); >>>>>>>> spin_unlock(&pcidevs_lock); >>>>>>> Hi Andrew, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Attached are the serial logs good (with revert) and bad (without): >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Some things that seems strange to me: >>>>>>> - The numerous calls to get the device 08:00.0 assigned ... for 0a:00.0 >>>>>>> there >>>>>>> was only one call to both test assign and assign. >>>>>>> - However these numerous calls are there in both the good and the bad >>>>>>> case, >>>>>>> so perhaps it's strange and wrong .. but not the cause .. >>>>>>> - I had a hunch it could be due to the 08:00.0 using MSI-X, but when >>>>>>> only >>>>>>> passing through 0a:00.0, i get the same numerous calls but now for >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> 0a:00.0 which uses IntX, so I think that is more related to being the >>>>>>> *first* >>>>>>> device to be passed through to a guest. >>>>>> I have also observed this behaviour, but not had time to investigate. >>>>>> It doesn't appear problematic in the longrun but it probably a toolstack >>>>>> issue which wants fixing (if only in the name of efficiency). >>>>> And just after I sent this email, I have realised why. >>>>> The first assign device will have to build IO pagetables, which is a >>>>> long operation and subject to hypercall continuations. The second >>>>> device will reused the same pagetables, so is quick to complete. >>>> So .. is the ioreq patch from Paul involved in providing something used in >>>> building >>>> the pagetables .. and could it have say some off by one resulting in the >>>> 0xffffffffffff .. which could lead to the pagetable building going beserk, >>>> requiring a paging_mode far greater than normally would be required .. >>>> which >>>> get's set .. since that isn't checked properly .. leading to things >>>> breaking >>>> a bit further when it does get checked ? >>> A -1 is slipping in somewhere and ending up in the gfn field. >>> The result is that update_paging_mode() attempts to construct >>> iopagetables to cover a 76bit address space, which is how level ends up >>> at 8. (Note that a level of 7 is reserved, and a level of anything >>> greater than 4 is implausible on your system.) >>> I think the crash is collateral damage following on from >>> update_paging_mode() not properly sanitising its input, but that there >>> is still some other issue causing -1 to be passed in the first place. >>> I am still trying to locate where a -1 might plausibly be coming from. >> I have just added some extra debug code to store the values from the start >> of update_paging_mode() .. so i can print them at the end if the paging_mode >> gets out of band and do a dump_stack() as well. Hopefully is will confirm >> this. > Right - arch_iommu_populate_page_table() is falling over a page > allocated to the domain which doesn't have a valid gfn. > The ioreq server allocates itself some guest pages and then shoots them > out as part of setting the server up. (This is a kudge to work around > the fact that Xen doesn't have an interface for device models etc to > allocate memory on behalf of the domain which will strictly never find > its way into the guest physmap.) > Can you try this patch and see whether some of the numbers printed out > start matching up? > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c > index bfde380..d1adfa7 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c > @@ -534,6 +534,10 @@ static int hvm_map_ioreq_page( > static void hvm_remove_ioreq_gmfn( > struct domain *d, struct hvm_ioreq_page *iorp) > { > + printk("*** %s() d%d, page %p, mfn %lx, gfn %lx, va %p\n", > + __func__, d->domain_id, + iorp->>page, page_to_mfn(iorp->page), iorp->gmfn, iorp->va); > + > guest_physmap_remove_page(d, iorp->gmfn, > page_to_mfn(iorp->page), 0); > clear_page(iorp->va); > diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c > b/xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c > index 9eb8d33..048a1a9 100644 > --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c > +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c > @@ -59,7 +59,16 @@ int arch_iommu_populate_page_table(struct domain *d) > if ( has_hvm_container_domain(d) || > (page->u.inuse.type_info & PGT_type_mask) == > PGT_writable_page ) > { > - BUG_ON(SHARED_M2P(mfn_to_gmfn(d, page_to_mfn(page)))); > + unsigned long mfn = page_to_mfn(page); > + unsigned long gfn = mfn_to_gmfn(d, mfn); > + > + BUG_ON(SHARED_M2P(gfn)); > + > + if ( gfn == INVALID_MFN ) > + { > + printk("*** %s() d%d, page %p, mfn %lx, gfn %lx - about > to break\n", > + __func__, d->domain_id, page, mfn, gfn); > + } > rc = hd->platform_ops->map_page( > d, mfn_to_gmfn(d, page_to_mfn(page)), page_to_mfn(page), > IOMMUF_readable|IOMMUF_writable); Ok .. so here we go: (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:24:59.418] *** hvm_remove_ioreq_gmfn() d1, page ffff82e0049f7700, mfn 24fbb8, gfn feff0, va ffff82c00082b000 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:24:59.452] *** hvm_remove_ioreq_gmfn() d1, page ffff82e0049f76e0, mfn 24fbb7, gfn feff1, va ffff82c00082d000 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:00.158] *** d0v5: test_assign_device({0000:0a:00.0}) (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:02.221] io.c:429: d1: bind: m_gsi=47 g_gsi=36 dev=00.00.5 intx=0 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:02.248] *** d0v1->d1: assign_device({0000:0a:00.0}) (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:02.268] ?!?!? d1: pci_dev:0000:0a:00.0 hd->arch.paging_mode:2 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:02.290] *** d0v1->d1: assign_device({0000:0a:00.0}) (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:02.310] ?!?!? d1: pci_dev:0000:0a:00.0 hd->arch.paging_mode:2 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:02.333] *** d0v1->d1: assign_device({0000:0a:00.0}) (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:02.353] ?!?!? d1: pci_dev:0000:0a:00.0 hd->arch.paging_mode:2 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:02.375] *** d0v1->d1: assign_device({0000:0a:00.0}) (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:02.395] ?!?!? d1: pci_dev:0000:0a:00.0 hd->arch.paging_mode:2 <BIG SNIP> (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:45.444] *** d0v1->d1: assign_device({0000:0a:00.0}) (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:45.464] ?!?!? d1: pci_dev:0000:0a:00.0 hd->arch.paging_mode:2 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:45.486] *** d0v1->d1: assign_device({0000:0a:00.0}) (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:45.506] ?!?!? d1: pci_dev:0000:0a:00.0 hd->arch.paging_mode:2 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:45.529] *** d0v1->d1: assign_device({0000:0a:00.0}) (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:45.549] ?!?!? d1: pci_dev:0000:0a:00.0 hd->arch.paging_mode:2 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:45.571] *** arch_iommu_populate_page_table() d1, page ffff82e0049f7700, mfn 24fbb8, gfn ffffffffffffffff - about to break (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:45.610] AMD-Vi: ?!?!? amd_iommu_map_page level before:3 gfn:0xffffffffffffffff mfn:0x24fbb8 flags:3 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:45.642] AMD-Vi: ?!?!? update_paging_mode level before:3 gfn:0xffffffffffffffff (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:45.669] AMD-Vi: ?!?!? update_paging_mode end: paging_mode:6 offset:31 root: old_root_mfn:0x11d55b new_root_mfn:0x11d55a gfn:0xffffffffffffffff req_id:0 PTE_PER_TABLE_SIZE:512 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:45.722] AMD-Vi: ?!?!? update_paging_mode end: values at start: paging_mode:3 offset:-1 gfn:0xffffffffffffffff (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:45.757] AMD-Vi: ?!?!? amd_iommu_map_page level after update paging mode:6 gfn:0xffffffffffffffff mfn:0x24fbb8 flags:3 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:45.794] AMD-Vi: ?!?!? amd_iommu_map_page level end:6 gfn:0xffffffffffffffff mfn:0x24fbb8 flags:3 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:45.826] *** arch_iommu_populate_page_table() d1, page ffff82e0049f76e0, mfn 24fbb7, gfn ffffffffffffffff - about to break (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:45.864] AMD-Vi: ?!?!? amd_iommu_map_page level before:6 gfn:0xffffffffffffffff mfn:0x24fbb7 flags:3 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:45.897] AMD-Vi: ?!?!? update_paging_mode level before:6 gfn:0xffffffffffffffff (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:45.924] AMD-Vi: ?!?!? update_paging_mode end: paging_mode:8 offset:1 root: old_root_mfn:0x11d554 new_root_mfn:0x11d553 gfn:0xffffffffffffffff req_id:0 PTE_PER_TABLE_SIZE:512 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:45.976] AMD-Vi: ?!?!? update_paging_mode end: values at start: paging_mode:6 offset:524287 gfn:0xffffffffffffffff (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.013] AMD-Vi: ?!?!? amd_iommu_map_page level after update paging mode:8 gfn:0xffffffffffffffff mfn:0x24fbb7 flags:3 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.050] AMD-Vi: ?!?!? iommu_pde_from_gfn: domid:1 table:1 level:8 pfn:0xffffffffffffffff (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.079] Xen BUG at iommu_map.c:459 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.095] ----[ Xen-4.6-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]---- (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.119] CPU: 2 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.131] RIP: e008:[<ffff82d080155d03>] iommu_pde_from_gfn+0x82/0x47a (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.156] RFLAGS: 0000000000010202 CONTEXT: hypervisor (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.177] rax: 0000000000000000 rbx: 0000000000000008 rcx: 0000000000000000 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.203] rdx: ffff830256f20000 rsi: 000000000000000a rdi: ffff82d0802986c0 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.230] rbp: ffff830256f27ad8 rsp: ffff830256f27a78 r8: ffff830256f30000 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.257] r9: 0000000000000002 r10: 0000000000000032 r11: 0000000000000002 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.284] r12: ffff82e0023aaa60 r13: 000000000024fb00 r14: 00000000000000e9 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.311] r15: 00007d2000000000 cr0: 0000000080050033 cr4: 00000000000006f0 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.337] cr3: 000000025f176000 cr2: ffff8000007f6800 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.358] ds: 0000 es: 0000 fs: 0000 gs: 0000 ss: e010 cs: e008 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.383] Xen stack trace from rsp=ffff830256f27a78: (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.403] ffff83025f7bd000 ffff830256f27b30 ffffffffffffffff ffff830200000030 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.430] ffff830256f27ae8 ffff830256f27aa8 0000000000000000 ffff83025f7bd000 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.457] ffff82e0049f76e0 000000000024fbb7 00000000000000e9 00007d2000000000 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.484] ffff830256f27b98 ffff82d0801562a9 0000000000000206 ffff830256f27b08 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.511] 000000000024fbb7 0000000000000003 ffff83025f7bd938 ffffffffffffffff (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.538] ffff83025f7bd000 ffff83025f7bd000 000000000024fbb7 0000000000000000 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.565] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.592] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff83025f7bd938 ffff83025f7bd000 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.619] ffff82e0049f76e0 000000000024fbb7 00000000000000e9 00007d2000000000 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.646] ffff830256f27bf8 ffff82d08015a7f8 0000000000000000 ffff83025f7bd020 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.673] 000000000024fbb7 ffff830256f20000 ffff830256f27bf8 0000000000000000 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.700] 000000000000000a 00007f017c8d1004 0000000000000000 ffff83025f7bd000 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.727] ffff830256f27c98 ffff82d08014c6e1 ffff830200000002 ffff82d08012c178 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.754] 0000000000000000 ffff830256f27c28 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.781] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00007f017c8d1004 0000000000000000 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.808] ffff82d080331034 ffff830256f20000 000000000025f176 00007f017c8d1004 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.835] ffff83025f7bd000 00007f017c8d1004 ffff83025f7bd000 0000000000000005 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.863] ffff830256f27ca8 ffff82d08014900b ffff830256f27d98 ffff82d080161f2d (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.890] 000000000023468c 0000000000000002 0000000000000005 0000000000000001 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.917] ffff82d080331bb8 0000000000000001 ffff830256f27de8 ffff82d080120c10 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.944] Xen call trace: (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.956] [<ffff82d080155d03>] iommu_pde_from_gfn+0x82/0x47a (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:46.979] [<ffff82d0801562a9>] amd_iommu_map_page+0x1ae/0x5ec (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:47.002] [<ffff82d08015a7f8>] arch_iommu_populate_page_table+0x164/0x4c3 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:47.028] [<ffff82d08014c6e1>] iommu_do_pci_domctl+0x491/0x740 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:47.051] [<ffff82d08014900b>] iommu_do_domctl+0x17/0x1a (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:47.073] [<ffff82d080161f2d>] arch_do_domctl+0x2469/0x26e1 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:47.095] [<ffff82d08010497f>] do_domctl+0x1a1f/0x1d60 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:47.116] [<ffff82d080234c6b>] syscall_enter+0xeb/0x145 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:47.137] (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:47.146] (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:47.155] **************************************** (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:47.174] Panic on CPU 2: (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:47.187] Xen BUG at iommu_map.c:459 (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:47.203] **************************************** (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:47.222] (XEN) [2015-04-11 19:25:47.231] Reboot in five seconds... _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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