[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] tools: Fix wild memory allocations from c/s 250f0b4 and 85d78b4
On 05/18/2015 10:09 AM, Andrew Cooper wrote: On 18/05/15 15:00, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:On 05/18/2015 08:57 AM, Andrew Cooper wrote:These changesets cause the respective libxc functions to unconditonally dereference their max_cpus/nodes parameters as part of initial memory allocations. It will fail at obtaining the correct number of cpus/nodes from Xen, as the guest handles will not be NULL. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> CC: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> CC: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> CC: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx> --- Spotted by XenServers Coverity run. --- tools/libxl/libxl.c | 4 ++-- tools/misc/xenpm.c | 4 ++-- tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)xenpm bug is already fixed (commit b315cd9cce5b6da7ca89b2d7bad3fb01e7716044 n the staging tree). I am not sure I understand why Coverity complains about other spots. For example, in libxl_get_cpu_topology() num_cpus can be left uninitialized only if xc_cputopoinfo(ctx->xch, &num_cpus, NULL) fails, in which case we go to 'GC_FREE; return ret;', so it's not ever used.xc_cputopoinfo(ctx->xch, &num_cpus, NULL) unconditionally dereferences and reads &num_cpus, and performs a memory allocation based on the result. Ah, OK. xc_cputopoinf() (or, rather, the hypervisor) actually doesn't use the value of dereferenced num_cpus in this case but obviously Coverity can't know about this. So Coverity cross-checks routines to see how callers use the arguments? -boris _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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