Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 1/5] libxl: allow /local/domain/0/device-model/$DOMID to be written by $DOMID

[Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Stefano Stabellini writes ("[PATCH v2 1/5] libxl: allow 
/local/domain/0/device-model/$DOMID to be written by $DOMID"):
> The device model is going to restrict its xenstore connection to $DOMID
> level. Let it access /local/domain/0/device-model/$DOMID, as it is
> required by QEMU to read/write the physmap. It doesn't contain any
> information the guest is not already fully aware of.

This permissions change needs to be accompanied, in its commit
message, with an argument explaining why it is safe.

In particular, we need to know that nothing uses information from this
path in an unsafe way (including in the case when the qemu is
privileged).

Ian.

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