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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [xen-4.3-testing test] 58404: regressions - FAIL
flight 58404 xen-4.3-testing real [real] http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/58404/ Regressions :-( Tests which did not succeed and are blocking, including tests which could not be run: test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 14 guest-localmigrate.2 fail in 58367 REGR. vs. 58060 Tests which are failing intermittently (not blocking): test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 14 guest-localmigrate.2 fail pass in 58367 Regressions which are regarded as allowable (not blocking): test-armhf-armhf-xl-sedf-pin 3 host-install(3) broken in 58367 like 57749 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 15 guest-localmigrate/x10 fail in 58367 like 57933 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 12 guest-localmigrate fail like 57933 test-amd64-i386-libvirt 11 guest-start fail like 58060 Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking: test-amd64-amd64-rumpuserxen-amd64 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-i386-rumpuserxen-i386 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 9 debian-hvm-install fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 9 debian-hvm-install fail never pass build-i386-rumpuserxen 6 xen-build fail never pass build-amd64-rumpuserxen 6 xen-build fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu 6 xen-boot fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-arndale 6 xen-boot fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-cubietruck 6 xen-boot fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 6 xen-boot fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 16 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 16 guest-stop fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl 6 xen-boot fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-sedf 6 xen-boot fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt 6 xen-boot fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-sedf-pin 6 xen-boot fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xend-qemut-winxpsp3 20 leak-check/check fail never pass version targeted for testing: xen 9176955cb837ba0752ca7ca7a197c9c394468e9f baseline version: xen e580a92dd53dbba62518e17a3f4ebd57b626926c ------------------------------------------------------------ People who touched revisions under test: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> ------------------------------------------------------------ jobs: build-amd64 pass build-armhf pass build-i386 pass build-amd64-libvirt pass build-armhf-libvirt pass build-i386-libvirt pass build-amd64-pvops pass build-armhf-pvops pass build-i386-pvops pass build-amd64-rumpuserxen fail build-i386-rumpuserxen fail test-amd64-amd64-xl pass test-armhf-armhf-xl fail test-amd64-i386-xl pass test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-amd pass test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-amd pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64 pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64 pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64 pass test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-amd64 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-rumpuserxen-amd64 blocked test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 fail test-armhf-armhf-xl-arndale fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-credit2 pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 fail test-armhf-armhf-xl-cubietruck fail test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-i386 pass test-amd64-i386-rumpuserxen-i386 blocked test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-intel pass test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-intel pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt fail test-amd64-i386-libvirt fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-multivcpu pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu fail test-amd64-amd64-pair pass test-amd64-i386-pair pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf-pin pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-sedf-pin fail test-amd64-amd64-pv pass test-amd64-i386-pv pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-sedf fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3-vcpus1 pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3-vcpus1 pass test-amd64-i386-xend-qemut-winxpsp3 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 pass ------------------------------------------------------------ sg-report-flight on osstest.test-lab.xenproject.org logs: /home/logs/logs images: /home/logs/images Logs, config files, etc. are available at http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs Test harness code can be found at http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb?p=osstest.git;a=summary Not pushing. ------------------------------------------------------------ commit 9176955cb837ba0752ca7ca7a197c9c394468e9f Author: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Date: Wed Jun 10 14:14:50 2015 +0100 QEMU_TAG update ======================================== commit 8fcecdca2dd1e6b4e78114977388ff0ddb85db20 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Wed Jun 10 14:14:25 2015 +0100 xen/pt: unknown PCI config space fields should be read-only ... by default. Add a per-device "permissive" mode similar to pciback's to allow restoring previous behavior (and hence break security again, i.e. should be used only for trusted guests). This is part of XSA-131. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>) commit c2ce1e99e4e16adb1b9abe5f720604a895134a70 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Wed Jun 10 14:14:25 2015 +0100 xen/pt: add a few PCI config space field descriptions Since the next patch will turn all not explicitly described fields read-only by default, those fields that have guest writable bits need to be given explicit descriptors. This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> commit 5d688f2be26717ff45cb960dcd6f2fa71461bfb4 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Wed Jun 10 14:14:25 2015 +0100 xen/pt: mark reserved bits in PCI config space fields The adjustments are solely to make the subsequent patches work right (and hence make the patch set consistent), namely if permissive mode (introduced by the last patch) gets used (as both reserved registers and reserved fields must be similarly protected from guest access in default mode, but the guest should be allowed access to them in permissive mode). This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> commit 9fa54a8818979ce375fa830402b5897996bbcc1a Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Wed Jun 10 14:14:25 2015 +0100 xen/pt: mark all PCIe capability bits read-only xen_pt_emu_reg_pcie[]'s PCI_EXP_DEVCAP needs to cover all bits as read- only to avoid unintended write-back (just a precaution, the field ought to be read-only in hardware). This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> commit 8599757a0a68333eca419e20561eaf49ab1f24e2 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Wed Jun 10 14:14:25 2015 +0100 xen/pt: split out calculation of throughable mask in PCI config space handling This is just to avoid having to adjust that calculation later in multiple places. Note that including ->ro_mask in get_throughable_mask()'s calculation is only an apparent (i.e. benign) behavioral change: For r/o fields it doesn't matter > whether they get passed through - either the same flag is also set in emu_mask (then there's no change at all) or the field is r/o in hardware (and hence a write won't change it anyway). This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx> commit 6bfd2cd948aa1bed3272bf41c838cb11b9175234 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Wed Jun 10 14:14:25 2015 +0100 xen/pt: correctly handle PM status bit xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_write() needs an adjustment to deal with the RW1C nature of the not passed through bit 15 (PCI_PM_CTRL_PME_STATUS). This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> commit 54e3720bca9873e6e903b9488758f3777f4d55ba Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Wed Jun 10 14:14:25 2015 +0100 xen/pt: consolidate PM capability emu_mask There's no point in xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_{read,write}() each ORing PCI_PM_CTRL_STATE_MASK and PCI_PM_CTRL_NO_SOFT_RESET into a local emu_mask variable - we can have the same effect by setting the field descriptor's emu_mask member suitably right away. Note that xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_write() is being retained in order to allow later patches to be less intrusive. This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> commit 1c8bd2b55744d18db7e3ff3084765ec30e1c0fd2 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Wed Jun 10 14:14:25 2015 +0100 xen/MSI: don't open-code pass-through of enable bit modifications Without this the actual XSA-131 fix would cause the enable bit to not get set anymore (due to the write back getting suppressed there based on the OR of emu_mask, ro_mask, and res_mask). Note that the fiddling with the enable bit shouldn't really be done by qemu, but making this work right (via libxc and the hypervisor) will require more extensive changes, which can be postponed until after the security issue got addressed. This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> commit bf53d1740edb05958c3e092e7c23cf9b1724cb06 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Wed Jun 10 14:14:05 2015 +0100 xen/MSI-X: disable logging by default ... to avoid allowing the guest to cause the control domain's disk to fill. This is XSA-130. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> commit 823757bf23f491d56a2d8353ddc838b83a3f8962 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Wed Jun 10 14:13:56 2015 +0100 xen: don't allow guest to control MSI mask register It's being used by the hypervisor. For now simply mimic a device not capable of masking, and fully emulate any accesses a guest may issue nevertheless as simple reads/writes without side effects. This is XSA-129. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> commit 835bc3eeba2cc52cc54b53578d78a2a7e56c54b6 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Wed Jun 10 14:13:52 2015 +0100 xen: properly gate host writes of modified PCI CFG contents The old logic didn't work as intended when an access spanned multiple fields (for example a 32-bit access to the location of the MSI Message Data field with the high 16 bits not being covered by any known field). Remove it and derive which fields not to write to from the accessed fields' emulation masks: When they're all ones, there's no point in doing any host write. This fixes a secondary issue at once: We obviously shouldn't make any host write attempt when already the host read failed. This is XSA-128. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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