[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

[Xen-devel] [xen-4.4-testing test] 58409: trouble: blocked/broken/fail/pass



flight 58409 xen-4.4-testing real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/58409/

Failures and problems with tests :-(

Tests which did not succeed and are blocking,
including tests which could not be run:
 build-armhf-pvops             3 host-install(3)         broken REGR. vs. 57474

Regressions which are regarded as allowable (not blocking):
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 15 guest-localmigrate/x10  fail like 57474

Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking:
 test-amd64-i386-rumpuserxen-i386  1 build-check(1)               blocked  n/a
 test-amd64-amd64-rumpuserxen-amd64  1 build-check(1)               blocked n/a
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2   1 build-check(1)               blocked  n/a
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu  1 build-check(1)               blocked  n/a
 test-armhf-armhf-libvirt      1 build-check(1)               blocked  n/a
 test-armhf-armhf-xl           1 build-check(1)               blocked  n/a
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-arndale   1 build-check(1)               blocked  n/a
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-sedf-pin  1 build-check(1)               blocked  n/a
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-sedf      1 build-check(1)               blocked  n/a
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-cubietruck  1 build-check(1)               blocked  n/a
 build-amd64-rumpuserxen       6 xen-build                    fail   never pass
 build-i386-rumpuserxen        6 xen-build                    fail   never pass
 test-amd64-i386-libvirt      12 migrate-support-check        fail   never pass
 test-amd64-amd64-libvirt     12 migrate-support-check        fail   never pass
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 16 guest-stop             fail never pass
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 16 guest-stop              fail never pass
 test-amd64-i386-xend-qemut-winxpsp3 20 leak-check/check        fail never pass

version targeted for testing:
 xen                  dc34ce4daf5d79eec71404e80a9ded847ad0afec
baseline version:
 xen                  5624637dc81624dc13f8db559def61538cccbafe

------------------------------------------------------------
People who touched revisions under test:
  Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx>
  Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
------------------------------------------------------------

jobs:
 build-amd64-xend                                             pass    
 build-i386-xend                                              pass    
 build-amd64                                                  pass    
 build-armhf                                                  pass    
 build-i386                                                   pass    
 build-amd64-libvirt                                          pass    
 build-armhf-libvirt                                          pass    
 build-i386-libvirt                                           pass    
 build-amd64-pvops                                            pass    
 build-armhf-pvops                                            broken  
 build-i386-pvops                                             pass    
 build-amd64-rumpuserxen                                      fail    
 build-i386-rumpuserxen                                       fail    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl                                          pass    
 test-armhf-armhf-xl                                          blocked 
 test-amd64-i386-xl                                           pass    
 test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-amd                           pass    
 test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-amd                           pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64                    pass    
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64                     pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64                    pass    
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64                     pass    
 test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-amd64                              pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64                         pass    
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64                          pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-rumpuserxen-amd64                           blocked 
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64                         fail    
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64                          fail    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64                         pass    
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64                          fail    
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-arndale                                  blocked 
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-credit2                                  pass    
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2                                  blocked 
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-cubietruck                               blocked 
 test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-i386                               pass    
 test-amd64-i386-rumpuserxen-i386                             blocked 
 test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-intel                         pass    
 test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-intel                         pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-libvirt                                     pass    
 test-armhf-armhf-libvirt                                     blocked 
 test-amd64-i386-libvirt                                      pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-multivcpu                                pass    
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu                                blocked 
 test-amd64-amd64-pair                                        pass    
 test-amd64-i386-pair                                         pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf-pin                                 pass    
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-sedf-pin                                 blocked 
 test-amd64-amd64-pv                                          pass    
 test-amd64-i386-pv                                           pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf                                     pass    
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-sedf                                     blocked 
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3-vcpus1                     pass    
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3-vcpus1                     pass    
 test-amd64-i386-xend-qemut-winxpsp3                          fail    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-winxpsp3                           pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3                           pass    


------------------------------------------------------------
sg-report-flight on osstest.test-lab.xenproject.org
logs: /home/logs/logs
images: /home/logs/images

Logs, config files, etc. are available at
    http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs

Test harness code can be found at
    http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb?p=osstest.git;a=summary

broken-step build-armhf-pvops host-install(3)

Not pushing.

------------------------------------------------------------
commit dc34ce4daf5d79eec71404e80a9ded847ad0afec
Author: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date:   Wed Jun 10 14:12:57 2015 +0100

    QEMU_TAG update
========================================
commit 5fabc183544e966ddb9147e218246c26d2561157
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Wed Jun 10 14:12:16 2015 +0100

    xen/pt: unknown PCI config space fields should be read-only
    
    ... by default. Add a per-device "permissive" mode similar to pciback's
    to allow restoring previous behavior (and hence break security again,
    i.e. should be used only for trusted guests).
    
    This is part of XSA-131.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>)

commit 755f99f9fe4529d4349079565c8935be6974ec87
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Wed Jun 10 14:12:16 2015 +0100

    xen/pt: add a few PCI config space field descriptions
    
    Since the next patch will turn all not explicitly described fields
    read-only by default, those fields that have guest writable bits need
    to be given explicit descriptors.
    
    This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>

commit 5c74b777c1860ba8d1394ab9676fab527f5ed714
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Wed Jun 10 14:12:16 2015 +0100

    xen/pt: mark reserved bits in PCI config space fields
    
    The adjustments are solely to make the subsequent patches work right
    (and hence make the patch set consistent), namely if permissive mode
    (introduced by the last patch) gets used (as both reserved registers
    and reserved fields must be similarly protected from guest access in
    default mode, but the guest should be allowed access to them in
    permissive mode).
    
    This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>

commit 65e39c802e62d2427f5c3df2c597e0c3780d50f0
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Wed Jun 10 14:12:16 2015 +0100

    xen/pt: mark all PCIe capability bits read-only
    
    xen_pt_emu_reg_pcie[]'s PCI_EXP_DEVCAP needs to cover all bits as read-
    only to avoid unintended write-back (just a precaution, the field ought
    to be read-only in hardware).
    
    This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit dd37ad776c7ea026b7b9f34b240f5714aee6819d
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Wed Jun 10 14:12:16 2015 +0100

    xen/pt: split out calculation of throughable mask in PCI config space 
handling
    
    This is just to avoid having to adjust that calculation later in
    multiple places.
    
    Note that including ->ro_mask in get_throughable_mask()'s calculation
    is only an apparent (i.e. benign) behavioral change: For r/o fields it
    doesn't matter > whether they get passed through - either the same flag
    is also set in emu_mask (then there's no change at all) or the field is
    r/o in hardware (and hence a write won't change it anyway).
    
    This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>

commit 903ee0042f24cde0c2079aafa1b31e0b4dd2ad34
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Wed Jun 10 14:12:16 2015 +0100

    xen/pt: correctly handle PM status bit
    
    xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_write() needs an adjustment to deal with the RW1C
    nature of the not passed through bit 15 (PCI_PM_CTRL_PME_STATUS).
    
    This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit cdad723c1e4bd517c1898825b9eb35509a6d0393
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Wed Jun 10 14:12:16 2015 +0100

    xen/pt: consolidate PM capability emu_mask
    
    There's no point in xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_{read,write}() each ORing
    PCI_PM_CTRL_STATE_MASK and PCI_PM_CTRL_NO_SOFT_RESET into a local
    emu_mask variable - we can have the same effect by setting the field
    descriptor's emu_mask member suitably right away. Note that
    xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_write() is being retained in order to allow later
    patches to be less intrusive.
    
    This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
    Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx>

commit 2736dd507ab8dee5abb8f046a36420c8c12638bf
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Wed Jun 10 14:12:16 2015 +0100

    xen/MSI: don't open-code pass-through of enable bit modifications
    
    Without this the actual XSA-131 fix would cause the enable bit to not
    get set anymore (due to the write back getting suppressed there based
    on the OR of emu_mask, ro_mask, and res_mask).
    
    Note that the fiddling with the enable bit shouldn't really be done by
    qemu, but making this work right (via libxc and the hypervisor) will
    require more extensive changes, which can be postponed until after the
    security issue got addressed.
    
    This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit 6d7cdb148912a320a1d329552a3db788ac24157c
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Wed Jun 10 14:12:00 2015 +0100

    xen/MSI-X: disable logging by default
    
    ... to avoid allowing the guest to cause the control domain's disk to
    fill.
    
    This is XSA-130.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit 1e2a2be008a15bc6f8ab19db400a076f8f598b12
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Wed Jun 10 14:11:47 2015 +0100

    xen: don't allow guest to control MSI mask register
    
    It's being used by the hypervisor. For now simply mimic a device not
    capable of masking, and fully emulate any accesses a guest may issue
    nevertheless as simple reads/writes without side effects.
    
    This is XSA-129.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit b0101be92c03396ace3de93b974fd527b2ff2779
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Wed Jun 10 14:11:34 2015 +0100

    xen: properly gate host writes of modified PCI CFG contents
    
    The old logic didn't work as intended when an access spanned multiple
    fields (for example a 32-bit access to the location of the MSI Message
    Data field with the high 16 bits not being covered by any known field).
    Remove it and derive which fields not to write to from the accessed
    fields' emulation masks: When they're all ones, there's no point in
    doing any host write.
    
    This fixes a secondary issue at once: We obviously shouldn't make any
    host write attempt when already the host read failed.
    
    This is XSA-128.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel


 


Rackspace

Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.