Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 10/10] x86/MSI-X: provide hypercall interface for mask-all control

[Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>]

El 19/06/15 a les 15.00, Jan Beulich ha escrit:
>>>> On 11.06.15 at 11:51, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> On 11/06/15 09:35, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>> While I continue to be of the opinion that all direct writes to
>>> interrupt masking bits (MSI-X mask-all, MSI-X per-entry mask,
>>> MSI per entry mask) outside of the hypervisor are wrong and
>>> should be eliminated, the scope of the problem now clearly
>>> going beyond qemu made me reconsider whether we shouldn't,
>>> as advocated by Stefano, follow the trap-and-emulate route
>>> instead. This would not only mean adding code to x86's existing
>>> port CF8/CFC intercepts, but also write-protecting the MMCFG
>>> pages for all PCI devices being MSI or MSI-X capable, emulating
>>> writes with inspection / modification of writes to any of the mask
>>> bits located in PCI config space. (A subsequent optimization to
>>> this may then be a hypercall to do config space writes,
>>> eliminating the emulation overhead, accompanied by a bitmap
>>> indicating which devices' CFG space can be written directly.)
>>>
>>> For a (from now on) timely resolution of the original problem I'd
>>> really appreciate opinions (or alternative suggestions).
>>
>> A very definite +1 from me.  I have previously suggested as much.
> 
> And now that I started looking into what it takes to make this
> work, I'm having a deja vu: In order for us to reliably intercept
> all CFG accesses, we need to whitelist the MMCFG pages of
> devices we know we don't care about being written. I.e. we
> need to start out with all of them being read-only. And the
> affected MFNs have to be known before Dom0 maps these
> pages (or else we would have to hunt down all the mappings in
> the page tables, which is nothing I consider even remotely
> reasonable). Yet, and here comes the deja vu, upstream Linux
> _still_ doesn't make use of PHYSDEVOP_pci_mmcfg_reserved.
> No idea whether FreeBSD or whatever else can be used as Dom0
> do. So no matter how we turn it, we have a dependency on the
> Dom0 kernel also being adjusted. In which case we might as well
> go the original route of requiring hypercalls to be used for certain
> operations to deal with the problem here.

FreeBSD doesn't implement PHYSDEVOP_pci_mmcfg_reserved ATM. I had a
patch to implement it, but it's completely useless with the way we map
MMIO regions on PVH right now.

Every hole in the e820 is basically mapped as a MMIO region _before_
starting Dom0, making the white/black listing done in
PHYSDEVOP_pci_mmcfg_reserved completely moot.

> Otoh the write interception has the potential of dealing with other
> problems (like that of XSAs 120 and 126), but making the security
> of Xen (in presence of the fix/workaround to the original problem
> here) dependent on a Dom0 side change not even on its way into
> the master Linux branch yet makes me really hesitant to try going
> that route. (And no, I'm not up to fighting for another pv-ops hook
> considering that I've never been really convinced of the pv-ops
> model in the first place.)
> 
> But then again the one thing we might consider saving us on the
> Linux side is that as of 2.6.25 base config space accesses don't
> get done via MMCFG anymore, and we don't have an immediate
> need to intercept extended ones (i.e. initially we might even get
> away without snooping MMCFG writes at all). Roger - how do
> things look like on the FreeBSD side?

I don't mind adding a PHYSDEVOP_pci_mmcfg_reserved call to FreeBSD, but
for it to have any effect we need to stop unconditionally mapping
everything as MMIO regions on PVH Dom0.

Then we need to expand XENMEM_add_to_physmap_batch so it can be used to
map MMIO regions on demand from Dom0 or modify
PHYSDEVOP_pci_mmcfg_reserved so it sets up the right mappings (1:1) for
auto-translated guests.

Roger.

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