[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 00/12] Alternate p2m: support multiple copies of host p2m


  • To: "Lengyel, Tamas" <tlengyel@xxxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2015 16:37:55 +0300
  • Cc: Ravi Sahita <ravi.sahita@xxxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>, Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx>, Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Ed White <edmund.h.white@xxxxxxxxx>, Xen-devel <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Comment: DomainKeys? See http://domainkeys.sourceforge.net/
  • Delivery-date: Wed, 24 Jun 2015 13:37:50 +0000
  • Domainkey-signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws; s=default; d=bitdefender.com; b=Pj5eu3c592QZT3RKvXE+SaKLqyHIwqmiD88fQS1rfjd4VM7p0KxnYSG7bS9QP5iSTc2neUg4yZaxQCDfWpQtipSm8Wd2bxl/vtFukjBpX9Dcvg0jT0ZnvHcBFDn1noiCUM6+nSeGU+lD5P8kgHFQRkRW0/RjfSIy3GjpNqfjfdC5a/ltOvs8sprKblsPUiRBe+P4WRH+L9mSgBZ7ku3revuL7KD65t5hB8Y6JaHy3obZS5pE8vOOVWIQWEwIO3H43Td3I55EvHBUiaqsYUZZM4qfv43ypbYSRT2Yd/YzTGg3VlN7qezxJpbvyVskuU4Nqd06VIWLCJIXVa8Ub1Zojg==; h=Received:Received:Received:Received:Received:Subject:To:References:Cc:From:Message-ID:Date:User-Agent:MIME-Version:In-Reply-To:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding:X-BitDefender-Scanner:X-BitDefender-Spam:X-BitDefender-SpamStamp:X-BitDefender-CF-Stamp;
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xen.org>

On 06/24/2015 04:32 PM, Lengyel, Tamas wrote:
> 
> 
> On Wed, Jun 24, 2015 at 1:39 AM, Razvan Cojocaru
> <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx <mailto:rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:
> 
>     On 06/24/2015 12:27 AM, Lengyel, Tamas wrote:
>     > I've extended xen-access to exercise this new feature taking into
>     > account some of the current limitations. Using the altp2m_write|exec
>     > options we create a duplicate view of the default hostp2m, and instead
>     > of relaxing the mem_access permissions when we encounter a violation, we
>     > swap the view on the violating vCPU while also enabling MTF
>     > singlestepping. When the singlestep event fires, we use the response to
>     > that event to swap the view back to the restricted altp2m view.
> 
>     That's certainly very interesting. I wonder what the benefits are in
>     this case over emulating the fault-causing instruction (other than
>     obviously not going through the emulator)? The altp2m method would
>     certainly be slower, since you need more round-trips from userspace to
>     the hypervisor (the EPT vm_event handling + the singlestep event,
>     whereas with emulation you just reply to the original vm_event).
> 
> 
>     Regards,
>     Razvan
> 
> 
> Certainly, this is pretty slow right now, especially for the altp2m_exec
> case. However, sometimes you simply cannot emulate. For example if you
> write breakpoints into target locations, the original instruction has
> been overwritten with 0xCC. If you have a duplicate of the page without
> the breakpoint, this is an easy way to make the guest fetch the original
> instruction. Of course, if you extend the emulation routine where you
> can provide the instruction to emulate, instead of it being fetched from
> guest memory, that would be equally useful ;)

Makes sense, thanks for the explanation! Sure, sending back the
instruction to emulate could be something to consider for the future.


Thanks,
Razvan

_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel


 


Rackspace

Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.