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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH RFC v2 0/4] HVM x86 deprivileged mode operations
Hi Fabio, On 04/09/15 11:46, Fabio Fantoni wrote: [snip] So, QEMU emulates devices for HVM guests. Now, letting the portio operation through to QEMU to emulate takes about 20e-6 seconds. But, that includes the time QEMU takes to actually emulate the port operation so is not the 'pure' overhead. I need to do more detailed analysis to get that figure.Sorry for my stupid questions: Is there a test with benchmark using qemu instead for know how is different? Qemu seems that emulate also some istructions cases that xen hypervisor doesn't for now, or I'm wrong? Is there any possible hardware technology or set of instructions for improve the operations also deprivileged or transition from Xen is obliged to control even mappings memory access? We're using sysret and syscall already to do the transition which are the fast system call operations. I don't have actual benchmark values for their execution time though. We map the depriv code, stack and data sections into the monitor table when initialising the HVM guest (user mode mapping) so Xen doesn't need to worry about those mappings whilst executing a depriv operation. I'm not quite sure what you're asking here, sorry! Are you asking if we can take an HVM guest instruction, analyse it to determine if it's safe to execute and then execute it rather than emulating it? If so:Is there any possible future hardware technology or set of instructions for take needed informations from hypervisor for executing directly all needed checks, them if ok and any possible exceptions/protections or delegate this to xen for each instruction with a tremendous impact on the efficiency can not be improved? QEMU handles device emulation and this is deliberately not done in Xen to reduce the attack surface of the hypervisor and keep it minimal. We do need to analyse instructions at some points (x86 emulate) but this is error prone (there's a paper or two on exploits of this feature). This is one of the reasons for considering a depriv mode in the first pace, by moving such code into a deprivileged area, we can prevent a bug in this code from leading to hypervisor compromise. I'm not aware of any future hardware or set of instructions but that doesn't mean there aren't/won't be! If I said only absurd things because of my knowledge too low about sorry for having wasted your time. Thanks for any reply and sorry for my bad english. np, I hope I've understood correctly!
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