[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/msr: Carry on after a non-"safe" MSR access fails without !panic_on_oops
On Mon, Sep 21, 2015 at 9:49 AM, Arjan van de Ven <arjan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 9/21/2015 9:36 AM, Linus Torvalds wrote: >> >> On Mon, Sep 21, 2015 at 1:46 AM, Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> >>> >>> Linus, what's your preference? >> >> >> So quite frankly, is there any reason we don't just implement >> native_read_msr() as just >> >> unsigned long long native_read_msr(unsigned int msr) >> { >> int err; >> unsigned long long val; >> >> val = native_read_msr_safe(msr, &err); >> WARN_ON_ONCE(err); >> return val; >> } >> >> Note: no inline, no nothing. Just put it in arch/x86/lib/msr.c, and be >> done with it. I don't see the downside. >> >> How many msr reads are <i>so</i> critical that the function call >> overhead would matter? > > > if anything qualifies it'd be switch_to() and friends. And maybe the KVM user return notifier. Unfortunately, switch_to might gain another two MSR accesses at some point if we decide to fix the bugs in there. Sigh. > > note that I'm not entirely happy about the notion of "safe" MSRs. > They're safe as in "won't fault". > Reading random MSRs isn't a generic safe operation though, but the name sort > of gives people > the impression that it is. Even with _safe variants, you still need to KNOW > the MSR exists (by means > of CPUID or similar) unfortunately. > I tend to agree. Anyway, the fully out-of-line approach isn't obviously a bad idea, and it simplifies the whole mess (we can drop most of the paravirt patches, too). I'll give it a try and see what happens. --Andy _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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