[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86: detect CMOS aliasing on ports other then 0x70/0x71
>>> On 23.09.15 at 20:34, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 22/09/15 14:10, Jan Beulich wrote: >> + for ( offs = 2; offs < 8; offs <<= 1 ) >> + { >> + bool_t read = 1; >> + >> + for ( i = RTC_REG_D + 1; i < 0x80; ++i ) >> + { >> + uint8_t normal, alt; >> + unsigned long flags; >> + >> + if ( i == acpi_gbl_FADT.century ) >> + continue; >> + >> + spin_lock_irqsave(&rtc_lock, flags); >> + >> + normal = CMOS_READ(i); >> + if ( inb(RTC_PORT(offs)) != i ) >> + read = 0; >> + >> + alt = inb(RTC_PORT(offs + 1)); >> + >> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rtc_lock, flags); >> + >> + if ( normal != alt ) >> + break; > > Even with a manual to hand, this logic is quite hard to understand. > Furthermore, I still cant spot how your r/w vs w/o logic is supposed to > work. It doesn't check the writability of the alias, but of the aliases > index. But that's the only interesting thing. A w/o alias would be rather strange. It's the index register that traditionally hasn't been readable, but has got means added in some chipsets to be read back. For the moment we don't make use of this information anyway, i.e. it's more a thing usable for validation that what the logic determines matches with how the chipset is documented to behave (if someone wanted to check that). > However, it is not robust to the system servicing an SMI and altering > the CMOS ram in the middle of this loop. Such a modification would > cause the loop to believe that this specific 'offs' is not an alias even > when it actually is. > > One option would be to reread the non-aliased port again, but that would > add yet more io reads. SMI is always a problem. Even if we re-read the register, we still couldn't be sure we haven't got hit by another SMI. Considering the index/data port access model I would anyway consider it quite bad for firmware to modify the CMOS in an SMI. Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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