[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v1 1/4] xsm/libxl/xen_version: Add XSM for some of the xen_version commands.
On Thu, 2015-10-08 at 22:56 -0400, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote: > The XENVER_[compile_info|changeset|commandline] are now > guarded by an XSM check. I can guess, but please explain/justify why this is the case for these here. > The rest: XENVER_[version|extraversion|capabilities| > parameters|get_features|page_size|guest_handle] behave > as before (no XSM check). and correspondingly why these ones to not warrant such a change. > As such we also modify the toolstack such that if we fail > to get any data instead of printing (null) we just print "". Perhaps the hypervisor should instead return "<denied>" or some suitable string indicating why (<denied-xsm>)? > @@ -720,4 +720,28 @@ static XSM_INLINE int xsm_pmu_op (XSM_DEFAULT_ARG > struct domain *d, unsigned int > } > } > > +#include <public/version.h> > +static XSM_INLINE int xsm_version_op (XSM_DEFAULT_ARG uint32_t op) > +{ > + XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV); > + switch ( op ) > + { > + case XENVER_compile_info: > + case XENVER_changeset: > + case XENVER_commandline: > + return xsm_default_action(XSM_PRIV, current->domain, NULL); > + case XENVER_version: > + case XENVER_extraversion: > + case XENVER_capabilities: > + case XENVER_platform_parameters: > + case XENVER_get_features: > + case XENVER_pagesize: > + case XENVER_guest_handle: > + /* The should _NEVER_ get here, but just in case. */ BUG_ON? IMHO such a comment should have a "because ..." in it. Actually, thinking about it, instead of splitting access control between do_xen_version and here it would be more normal to have this function DTRT and for it to be called unconditionally. Ian. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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