[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH XEN v6 29/32] tools/libs/call: Use O_CLOEXEC when opening /dev/xen/privcmd on Linux
Ian Campbell writes ("[PATCH XEN v6 29/32] tools/libs/call: Use O_CLOEXEC when opening /dev/xen/privcmd on Linux"): > We stick with using FD_CLOEXEC on the legacy /proc/xen/privcmd > fallback device since it was present in older kernel where O_CLOEXEC > may not be assured. This is a lot of effort and may not be needed. I don't object, but some of the statements are (I think) rather too fierce: > + /* > + * This file descriptor is opaque to the caller, thus we must take > + * responsibility to ensure it doesn't propagate (ie leak) outside > + * the process, by using CLOEXEC. > + */ For example, I don't think this is a `must' at all, although not propagating irrelevant fds is (nowadays) seen as polite. Ian. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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