[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH RFC v2 4/4] xen/MSI: re-expose masking capability
On Mon, 7 Dec 2015, Jan Beulich wrote: > >>> On 07.12.15 at 15:56, <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Mon, 7 Dec 2015, Jan Beulich wrote: > >> >>> On 07.12.15 at 13:45, <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >> > On Tue, 24 Nov 2015, Jan Beulich wrote: > >> >> Now that the hypervisor intercepts all config space writes and monitors > >> >> changes to the masking flags, this undoes the main effect of the > >> >> XSA-129 fix, exposing the masking capability again to guests. > > > > Could you please mention the relevant commit ids in Xen? > > It's just one (which I've now added a reference to), unless you want > all the prereqs listed. One is probably OK. > > What happens if QEMU, with this change, is running on top of an older > > Xen that doesn't intercepts all config space writes? > > The security issue would resurface. > > >> >> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> > >> >> --- > >> >> TBD: We probably need to deal with running on an older hypervisor. I > >> >> can't, however, immediately see a way for qemu to find out. > >> > > >> > Actually QEMU has already an infrastructure to detect the hypervisor > >> > version at compile time, see include/hw/xen/xen_common.h. You could > >> > #define the right emu_mask depending on the hypervisor. > >> > >> We don't want compile time detection here, but runtime one. > > > > I guess the issue is that a fix was backported to Xen that changed its > > behaviour in past releases, right? > > No, we shouldn't try to guess whether this is present in any pre-4.6 > hypervisors; we should simply accept that maskable MSI is not > available for guests there, because ... > > > Is there a way to detect the presence of this fix in Xen, by invoking an > > hypercall and checking the returned values and error numbers? > > ... there's nothing to (reliably) probe here. This really is just an > implementation detail of the hypervisor, and hence a version check > is all we have available. In that case, I think we should stay on the safe side, and only expose the masking capability (only take into effects the changes that this patch makes) for Xen >= 4.7. What do you think? _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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