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Re: [Xen-devel] Xen Security Advisory 155 (CVE-2015-8550) - paravirtualized drivers incautious about shared memory

On Mon, Jan 04, 2016 at 02:06:32PM +0100, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 22, 2015 at 10:06:25AM -0500, Eric Shelton wrote:
> > The XSA mentions that "PV frontend patches will be developed and
> > released (publicly) after the embargo date."  Has anything been done
> > towards this that should also be incorporated into MiniOS?  On a
> > system utilizing a "driver domain," where a backend is running on a
> > domain that is considered unprivileged and untrusted (such as the
> > example described in http://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Driver_Domain),
> > it seems XSA-155-style double fetch vulnerabilities in the frontends
> > are also a potential security concern, and should be eliminated.
> > However, perhaps that does not include pcifront, since pciback would
> > always be running in dom0.
> And BTW the same applies to Linux frontends, for which also I haven't seen
> any public development. In attachment my email to
> xen-security-issues-discuss list (sent during embargo), with patches
> attached there. I haven't got any response.

Could you post it using git-send-email please? I took a quick glance at them
but didn't get a chance to do an indepth look.

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