[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2] x86/hvm: Allow the guest to permit the use of userspace hypercalls
On Mon, 11 Jan 2016, Andrew Cooper wrote: > Currently, hypercalls issued from HVM userspace will unconditionally fail with > -EPERM. > > This is inflexible, and a guest may wish to allow userspace to make > hypercalls. > > Introduce HVMOP_set_hypercall_dpl which allows the guest to alter the > permissions check for hypercalls. It behaves exactly like the dpl field for > GDT/LDT/IDT entries. > > As the dpl is initialised to 0, hypercalls are restricted to cpl0 code until > the OS explicitly chooses an alternative. > > Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> > -- > CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> > CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> > CC: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> > > v2: > * Fix rcu lock and dpl check. > * Use uint8_t for hypercall_dpl and reposition for better packing. > > The test framework (soon to be published officially) how has both positive and > negative tests to confirm the correct behaviour of this hypercall. > > Arm folks: Is something like this sufficiently generic to be useful on Arm, > perhaps with more generic naming? Hypercalls on ARM are made issuing an HVC instruction which is "UNDEFINED in Secure state, and in User mode in Non-secure state". In other words, it cannot work. > PV guest support for userspace hypercalls is substantially more involved, and > will take longer to complete. > --- > xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h | 2 ++ > xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h | 8 ++++++++ > 3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c > index 21470ec..5f3be6b 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c > @@ -5228,7 +5228,8 @@ int hvm_do_hypercall(struct cpu_user_regs *regs) > case 4: > case 2: > hvm_get_segment_register(curr, x86_seg_ss, &sreg); > - if ( unlikely(sreg.attr.fields.dpl) ) > + if ( unlikely(sreg.attr.fields.dpl > > + currd->arch.hvm_domain.hypercall_dpl) ) > { > default: > regs->eax = -EPERM; > @@ -6839,6 +6840,31 @@ long do_hvm_op(unsigned long op, > XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg) > rc = do_altp2m_op(arg); > break; > > + case HVMOP_set_hypercall_dpl: > + { > + xen_hvm_hypercall_dpl_t a; > + struct domain *d; > + > + if ( copy_from_guest(&a, arg, 1 ) ) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + d = rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id(a.domid); > + if ( d == NULL ) > + return -ESRCH; > + > + if ( current->domain != d ) > + return -EPERM; > + > + if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) ) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + if ( a.dpl > 3 ) > + return -EDOM; > + > + d->arch.hvm_domain.hypercall_dpl = a.dpl; > + break; > + } > + > default: > { > gdprintk(XENLOG_DEBUG, "Bad HVM op %ld.\n", op); > diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h > b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h > index a8cc2ad..ac426ce 100644 > --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h > +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h > @@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ struct hvm_domain { > spinlock_t uc_lock; > bool_t is_in_uc_mode; > > + uint8_t hypercall_dpl; > + > /* Pass-through */ > struct hvm_iommu hvm_iommu; > > diff --git a/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h b/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h > index 1606185..f8247db 100644 > --- a/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h > +++ b/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h > @@ -489,6 +489,14 @@ struct xen_hvm_altp2m_op { > typedef struct xen_hvm_altp2m_op xen_hvm_altp2m_op_t; > DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_hvm_altp2m_op_t); > > +#define HVMOP_set_hypercall_dpl 26 > +struct xen_hvm_hypercall_dpl { > + domid_t domid; > + uint16_t dpl; /* IN[1:0] cpl required to make hypercalls. */ > +}; > +typedef struct xen_hvm_hypercall_dpl xen_hvm_hypercall_dpl_t; > +DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_hvm_hypercall_dpl_t); > + > #endif /* __XEN_PUBLIC_HVM_HVM_OP_H__ */ > > /* > -- > 2.1.4 > _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |