[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH RFC] x86/vMSI-X: avoid missing first unmask of vectors
> -----Original Message----- > From: Paul Durrant > Sent: 01 April 2016 15:20 > To: 'Jan Beulich' > Cc: Andrew Cooper; Anthony Perard; Stefano Stabellini; xen-devel; Keir > (Xen.org) > Subject: RE: [PATCH RFC] x86/vMSI-X: avoid missing first unmask of vectors > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Jan Beulich [mailto:JBeulich@xxxxxxxx] > > Sent: 01 April 2016 15:18 > > To: Paul Durrant > > Cc: Andrew Cooper; Anthony Perard; Stefano Stabellini; xen-devel; Keir > > (Xen.org) > > Subject: RE: [PATCH RFC] x86/vMSI-X: avoid missing first unmask of vectors > > > > >>> On 01.04.16 at 15:54, <Paul.Durrant@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > >> From: Jan Beulich [mailto:JBeulich@xxxxxxxx] > > >> Sent: 01 April 2016 14:43 > > >> >>> On 01.04.16 at 15:01, <Paul.Durrant@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > >> >> From: Jan Beulich [mailto:JBeulich@xxxxxxxx] > > >> >> Sent: 01 April 2016 12:21 > > >> >> >>> On 01.04.16 at 12:56, <Paul.Durrant@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > >> >> >> From: Jan Beulich [mailto:JBeulich@xxxxxxxx] > > >> >> >> Sent: 01 April 2016 10:59 > > >> >> > I guess it could be handled entirely in Xen if we are willing to > > >> >> > snoop > > on > > >> >> > PCI configuration. It would not be too hard to snoop guest writes to > > the > > >> >> BARs > > >> >> > in config space so that Xen can keep track of where they are. > > Snooping > > >> on > > >> >> the > > >> >> > MSI-X capability could then tell Xen when to start interposing on > the > > >> table, > > >> >> > and allow it to discover the GPA at that point (via the BIR and > > >> >> > offset > > >> >> > values). > > >> >> > > >> >> Well, that's a possibility, but won't - afaict - work without qemu's > > >> >> help at another point: So far we don't know the guest's PCI bus > > >> >> topology, hence we can't correlate vBAR writes we might snoop > > >> >> with the physical devices they correspond to. > > >> > > > >> > Does Xen need to know that correspondence just to track state? I > > thought > > >> the > > >> > problem here was that Xen does not see every guest access to an > MSI-X > > >> table. > > >> > If Xen always interposes on MSI-X tables then it can at least track the > > > state > > >> > of the emulated table, even if we end up just forwarding the access > for > > >> QEMU > > >> > to handle at first. When the mapping is created to the actual h/w table > > >> then, > > >> > presumably, Xen's idea of state should correspond to QEMU's. > > >> > > >> But Xen doesn't see the guest view of config space, > > > > > > Well Xen interposes on every single config cycle so arguably it sees > exactly > > > what the guest sees. > > > > Ah, so you mean to snoop what qemu returns. Yes, that would be > > an option. > > > > >> And additionally msixtbl_addr_to_desc() needs to know the physical > > >> device. > > > > > > Yes, but msixtbl_range() could be trivially changed to accept any access > > > where msixtbl_find_entry() returns non-NULL. That would allow > > msixtbl_write() > > > to manipulate entry->flags even if msixtbl_addr_to_desc() returns NULL. > > > > Are you looking at some old code base? There's no entry->flags > > manipulation. We call guest_mask_msi_irq(), and for that we need > > to know the IRQ descriptor, which in turn requires knowing the > > pdev (for msixtbl_addr_to_desc() to return non-NULL). > > Ah, maybe I'm out of date. I haven't pulled for a day or so. > I pulled staging and I still see (starting at line 300 in vmsi.c) /* Exit to device model when unmasking and address/data got modified. */ if ( !(val & PCI_MSIX_VECTOR_BITMASK) && test_and_clear_bit(nr_entry, &entry->table_flags) ) { v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hvm_io.msix_unmask_address = address; goto out; } msi_desc = msixtbl_addr_to_desc(entry, address); if ( !msi_desc || msi_desc->irq < 0 ) goto out; I was wrong about the name. I meant 'entry->table_flags', and that's clearly manipulated before calling msixtbl_addr_to_desc() so even if that returns NULL Xen still keeps in sync with QEMU AFAICT. Paul > Paul > > > > > Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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