|
[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH v5 21/21] tools/libxc: Calculate xstate cpuid leaf from guest information
The existing logic is broken for heterogeneous migration. By always
advertising the host maximum xstate, a migration to a less capable host always
fails as Xen cannot accomodate the xcr0_accum in the migration stream.
By calculating xstate from the feature information (which a multi-host
toolstack will have levelled appropriately), the guest will have the current
hosts maximum xstate advertised, allowing for correct migration to less
capable hosts.
In addition, some further improvements and corrections:
- don't discard the known flags in sub-leaves 2..63 ECX
- zap sub-leaves beyond 62
- zap all bits in leaf 1, EBX/ECX. No XSS features are currently supported.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
---
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
v3:
* Reintroduce MPX adjustment (this series has been in development since
before the introduction of MPX upstream, and it got lost in a rebase).
v4:
* Fold further improvements from Jan.
v5:
* Reintroduce PKRU, (again, lost due to rebasing).
* Rewrite the commit message and comments to try and better explain why I am
deliberatly removing host-specific information from the xstate calculation.
* Reintroduce 0xFFFFFFFF masks for EAX, to avoid Coverity complaining about
truncation on assignment.
---
tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 75 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c b/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c
index fc7e20a..6d14904 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c
@@ -398,54 +398,115 @@ static void intel_xc_cpuid_policy(xc_interface *xch,
}
}
+/* XSTATE bits in XCR0. */
+#define X86_XCR0_X87 (1ULL << 0)
+#define X86_XCR0_SSE (1ULL << 1)
+#define X86_XCR0_AVX (1ULL << 2)
+#define X86_XCR0_BNDREG (1ULL << 3)
+#define X86_XCR0_BNDCSR (1ULL << 4)
+#define X86_XCR0_PKRU (1ULL << 9)
+#define X86_XCR0_LWP (1ULL << 62)
+
+#define X86_XSS_MASK (0) /* No XSS states supported yet. */
+
+/* Per-component subleaf flags. */
+#define XSTATE_XSS (1ULL << 0)
+#define XSTATE_ALIGN64 (1ULL << 1)
+
/* Configure extended state enumeration leaves (0x0000000D for xsave) */
static void xc_cpuid_config_xsave(xc_interface *xch,
const struct cpuid_domain_info *info,
const unsigned int *input, unsigned int
*regs)
{
- if ( info->xfeature_mask == 0 )
+ uint64_t guest_xfeature_mask;
+
+ if ( info->xfeature_mask == 0 ||
+ !test_bit(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE, info->featureset) )
{
regs[0] = regs[1] = regs[2] = regs[3] = 0;
return;
}
+ guest_xfeature_mask = X86_XCR0_SSE | X86_XCR0_X87;
+
+ if ( test_bit(X86_FEATURE_AVX, info->featureset) )
+ guest_xfeature_mask |= X86_XCR0_AVX;
+
+ if ( test_bit(X86_FEATURE_MPX, info->featureset) )
+ guest_xfeature_mask |= X86_XCR0_BNDREG | X86_XCR0_BNDCSR;
+
+ if ( test_bit(X86_FEATURE_PKU, info->featureset) )
+ guest_xfeature_mask |= X86_XCR0_PKRU;
+
+ if ( test_bit(X86_FEATURE_LWP, info->featureset) )
+ guest_xfeature_mask |= X86_XCR0_LWP;
+
+ /*
+ * In the common case, the toolstack will have queried Xen for the maximum
+ * available featureset, and guest_xfeature_mask should not able to be
+ * calculated as being greater than the host limit, info->xfeature_mask.
+ *
+ * Nothing currently prevents a toolstack (or an optimistic user) from
+ * purposefully trying to select a larger-than-available xstate set.
+ *
+ * To avoid the domain dying with an unexpected fault, clamp the
+ * calculated mask to the host limit. Future development work will remove
+ * this possibility, when Xen fully audits the complete cpuid polcy set
+ * for a domain.
+ */
+ guest_xfeature_mask &= info->xfeature_mask;
+
switch ( input[1] )
{
- case 0:
+ case 0:
/* EAX: low 32bits of xfeature_enabled_mask */
- regs[0] = info->xfeature_mask & 0xFFFFFFFF;
+ regs[0] = guest_xfeature_mask & 0xFFFFFFFF;
/* EDX: high 32bits of xfeature_enabled_mask */
- regs[3] = (info->xfeature_mask >> 32) & 0xFFFFFFFF;
+ regs[3] = guest_xfeature_mask >> 32;
/* ECX: max size required by all HW features */
{
unsigned int _input[2] = {0xd, 0x0}, _regs[4];
regs[2] = 0;
- for ( _input[1] = 2; _input[1] < 64; _input[1]++ )
+ for ( _input[1] = 2; _input[1] <= 62; _input[1]++ )
{
cpuid(_input, _regs);
if ( (_regs[0] + _regs[1]) > regs[2] )
regs[2] = _regs[0] + _regs[1];
}
}
- /* EBX: max size required by enabled features.
- * This register contains a dynamic value, which varies when a guest
- * enables or disables XSTATE features (via xsetbv). The default size
- * after reset is 576. */
+ /* EBX: max size required by enabled features.
+ * This register contains a dynamic value, which varies when a guest
+ * enables or disables XSTATE features (via xsetbv). The default size
+ * after reset is 576. */
regs[1] = 512 + 64; /* FP/SSE + XSAVE.HEADER */
break;
+
case 1: /* leaf 1 */
regs[0] = info->featureset[featureword_of(X86_FEATURE_XSAVEOPT)];
- regs[2] &= info->xfeature_mask;
- regs[3] = 0;
+ regs[1] = 0;
+
+ if ( test_bit(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES, info->featureset) )
+ {
+ regs[2] = guest_xfeature_mask & X86_XSS_MASK & 0xFFFFFFFF;
+ regs[3] = (guest_xfeature_mask >> 32) & X86_XSS_MASK;
+ }
+ else
+ regs[2] = regs[3] = 0;
break;
- case 2 ... 63: /* sub-leaves */
- if ( !(info->xfeature_mask & (1ULL << input[1])) )
+
+ case 2 ... 62: /* per-component sub-leaves */
+ if ( !(guest_xfeature_mask & (1ULL << input[1])) )
{
regs[0] = regs[1] = regs[2] = regs[3] = 0;
break;
}
/* Don't touch EAX, EBX. Also cleanup ECX and EDX */
- regs[2] = regs[3] = 0;
+ regs[2] &= XSTATE_XSS | XSTATE_ALIGN64;
+ regs[3] = 0;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ regs[0] = regs[1] = regs[2] = regs[3] = 0;
break;
}
}
--
2.1.4
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
|
 |
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |