[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 3/3] x86/ioreq server: Add HVMOP to map guest ram with p2m_ioreq_server to an ioreq server
On 31/03/16 11:53, Yu Zhang wrote: > A new HVMOP - HVMOP_map_mem_type_to_ioreq_server, is added to > let one ioreq server claim/disclaim its responsibility for the > handling of guest pages with p2m type p2m_ioreq_server. Users > of this HVMOP can specify whether the p2m_ioreq_server is supposed > to handle write accesses or read ones or both in a parameter named > flags. For now, we only support one ioreq server for this p2m type, > so once an ioreq server has claimed its ownership, subsequent calls > of the HVMOP_map_mem_type_to_ioreq_server will fail. Users can also > disclaim the ownership of guest ram pages with this p2m type, by > triggering this new HVMOP, with ioreq server id set to the current > owner's and flags parameter set to 0. > > For now, both HVMOP_map_mem_type_to_ioreq_server and p2m_ioreq_server > are only supported for HVMs with HAP enabled. > > Note that flags parameter(if not 0) of this HVMOP only indicates > which kind of memory accesses are to be forwarded to an ioreq server, > it has impact on the access rights of guest ram pages, but are not > the same. Due to hardware limitations, if only write operations are > to be forwarded, read ones will be performed at full speed, with > no hypervisor intervention. But if read ones are to be forwarded to > an ioreq server, writes will inevitably be trapped into hypervisor, > which means significant performance impact. > > Also note that this HVMOP_map_mem_type_to_ioreq_server will not > change the p2m type of any guest ram page, until HVMOP_set_mem_type > is triggered. So normally the steps should be the backend driver > first claims its ownership of guest ram pages with p2m_ioreq_server > type, and then sets the memory type to p2m_ioreq_server for specified > guest ram pages. > > Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@xxxxxxxxxx> > Signed-off-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx> > Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> > Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@xxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx> > --- > xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c | 125 > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 95 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/nested_hap.c | 2 +- > xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c | 14 ++++- > xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pt.c | 25 +++++--- > xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c | 82 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ > xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c | 3 +- > xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h | 36 +++++++++-- > xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h | 37 ++++++++++++ > 9 files changed, 395 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c > index ddc8007..77a4793 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c > @@ -94,11 +94,69 @@ static const struct hvm_io_handler null_handler = { > .ops = &null_ops > }; > > +static int mem_read(const struct hvm_io_handler *io_handler, > + uint64_t addr, > + uint32_t size, > + uint64_t *data) > +{ > + struct domain *currd = current->domain; > + unsigned long gmfn = paddr_to_pfn(addr); > + unsigned long offset = addr & ~PAGE_MASK; > + struct page_info *page = get_page_from_gfn(currd, gmfn, NULL, > P2M_UNSHARE); > + uint8_t *p; > + > + if ( !page ) > + return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE; > + > + p = __map_domain_page(page); > + p += offset; > + memcpy(data, p, size); What happens when offset + size crosses the page boundary? > diff --git a/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h b/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h > index a1eae52..d46f186 100644 > --- a/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h > +++ b/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h > @@ -489,6 +489,43 @@ struct xen_hvm_altp2m_op { > typedef struct xen_hvm_altp2m_op xen_hvm_altp2m_op_t; > DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_hvm_altp2m_op_t); > > +#if defined(__XEN__) || defined(__XEN_TOOLS__) > + > +/* > + * HVMOP_map_mem_type_to_ioreq_server : map or unmap the IOREQ Server <id> > + * to specific memroy type <type> > + * for specific accesses <flags> > + * > + * Note that if only write operations are to be forwarded to an ioreq server, > + * read operations will be performed with no hypervisor intervention. But if > + * flags indicates that read operations are to be forwarded to an ioreq > server, > + * write operations will inevitably be trapped into hypervisor, whether they > + * are emulated by hypervisor or forwarded to ioreq server depends on the > flags > + * setting. This situation means significant performance impact. > + */ > +#define HVMOP_map_mem_type_to_ioreq_server 26 > +struct xen_hvm_map_mem_type_to_ioreq_server { > + domid_t domid; /* IN - domain to be serviced */ > + ioservid_t id; /* IN - ioreq server id */ > + hvmmem_type_t type; /* IN - memory type */ hvmmem_type_t is an enum and doesn't have a fixed width. It can't be used in the public API. You also have some implicit padding holes as a result of the layout. ~Andrew > + uint32_t flags; /* IN - types of accesses to be forwarded to the > + ioreq server. flags with 0 means to unmap the > + ioreq server */ > +#define _HVMOP_IOREQ_MEM_ACCESS_READ 0 > +#define HVMOP_IOREQ_MEM_ACCESS_READ \ > + (1u << _HVMOP_IOREQ_MEM_ACCESS_READ) > + > +#define _HVMOP_IOREQ_MEM_ACCESS_WRITE 1 > +#define HVMOP_IOREQ_MEM_ACCESS_WRITE \ > + (1u << _HVMOP_IOREQ_MEM_ACCESS_WRITE) > +}; > +typedef struct xen_hvm_map_mem_type_to_ioreq_server > + xen_hvm_map_mem_type_to_ioreq_server_t; > +DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_hvm_map_mem_type_to_ioreq_server_t); > + > +#endif /* defined(__XEN__) || defined(__XEN_TOOLS__) */ > + > + > #endif /* __XEN_PUBLIC_HVM_HVM_OP_H__ */ > > /* _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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